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Abstract: This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg game of backward stochastic differ-
ential equations (BSDEs) with partial information, where the information of the follower is a
sub-σ-algebra of that of the leader. Necessary and sufficient conditions of the optimality for
the follower and the leader are first given for the general problem, by the partial information
stochastic maximum principles of BSDEs and forward-backward stochastic differential equations
(FBSDEs), respectively. Then a linear-quadratic (LQ) Stackelberg game of BSDEs with partial
information is investigated. The state estimate feedback representation for the optimal control
of the follower is first given via two Riccati equations. Then the leader’s problem is formulated as
an optimal control problem of FBSDE. Four high-dimensional Riccati equations are introduced
to represent the state estimate feedback for the optimal control of the leader. Theoretic results
are applied to a pension fund management problem of two players in the financial market.
Keywords: Stackelberg game, backward stochastic differential equation, partial information,
maximum principle, linear-quadratic control
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1 Introduction
The Stackelberg game is also known as the leader-follower game, which can be traced back to the
early work by Stackelberg [36], when he defined a concept of a hierarchical solution for markets
where some firms have power of domination over others. The solutions, in the context of the
differential game, is called the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium points in which there are
two players with asymmetric roles, one leader and one follower. For obtaining the Stackelberg
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solutions, it is usual to divide the game problem into two parts. In the first part, which is also
known as the follower’s problem, firstly the leader announces his strategy, then the follower will
make an instantaneous response, and choose an optimal strategy corresponding to the given
leader’s strategy to minimize (or maximize) his cost functional. In the second part, knowing
the follower would take such an optimal strategy, the leader will choose an optimal strategy to
minimize (or maximize) his cost functional. Overall, the decisions must be made by two player
and one of them is subordinated to the other because of the asymmetric roles, therefore one
player must making a decision after the other player’s decision is made.
The Stackelberg game has wide practical financial and economical backgrounds, and has
attracted more and more research attentions with applications. Simann and Cruz [35] made an
early study on the properties of the Stackelberg solution in static and dynamic non-zero sum
two-player games. Bagchi and Bas¸ar [2] investigated an LQ stochastic Stackelberg differential
game, where the state and control variables do not enter the diffusion coefficient in the state
equation. Yong [45] studied an LQ leader-follower differential game in a more general framework
where the coefficients of the system and the cost functionals are random, the diffusion of the
state equation contains the control variables, and the weight matrices for the controls in cost
functionals are not necessarily positive definite. Øksendal et al. [25] proved a maximum principle
for a Stackelberg differential game with jump-diffusion, and applied the result to a continuous
time newsvendor problem. Bensoussan et al. [3] introduced several solution concepts in terms
of the players’ information sets, and studied LQ Stackelberg games under both adapted open-
loop and closed-loop memoryless information structures, whereas the control variables do not
enter the diffusion coefficient of the state equation. Meanwhile, the Stackelberg games have
been investigated in the mean-field, time-delay, partial information and other fields. Recently,
Xu and Zhang [44] studied the discrete-time leader-follower game with time delay and the new
co-states which capture the future information of the control and the new state which contains
the past effects are introduced to overcome the noncausality of strategy design caused by the
delay, then the same technique is used to deal with the continuous-time system. Then Xu et
al. [43] studied the leader-follower differential game with time delay appearing in the leader’s
control, the open-loop solution is given in the form of the conditional expectation with respect
to several symmetric Riccati equations by mainly establishing the nonhomogeneous relationship
between the forward and the backward variables. Moon and Bas¸ar [24] investigated an LQ
mean field Stackelberg differential game with the adapted open-loop information structure of
the leader where there are only one leader but arbitrarily large number of followers. Lin et al.
[22] studied the open-loop LQ Stackelberg game of the mean-field stochastic systems in finite
horizon, and a sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of the stackelberg strategy
was given in terms of the solvability of some Riccati equations and a convexity condition by
introducing new state and costate variables. Shi et al. [32] introduced a new explanation for the
asymmetric information feature that the information available to the follower is based on the
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some sub-σ-algebra of that available to the leader for the Stackelberg differential game. Then an
LQ stochastic Stackelberg differential game with noisy observation was solved via some measure
transformation, filtering technique, linear FBSDE and mean-field FBSDE decoupling technique,
where not all the diffusion coefficients contain the control variables. Shi et al. [34] studied
an LQ stochastic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric information, where the control
variables enter both diffusion coefficients of the state equation. Shi et al. [33] investigated a kind
of stochastic LQ Stackelberg differential game with overlapping information which means that
the follower’s and the leader’s information have some joint part, while they have no inclusion
relation. Li and Yu [19] proved the uniqueness and solvability of a kind of coupled forward-
backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) with a multilevel self-similar domination-
monotonicity structure, then this kind of FBSDEs is used to characterize the unique equilibrium
of an LQ generalized Stackelberg game with hierarchy in a closed form.
Different from forward stochastic differential equations (SDEs) where a prescribed initial
condition x(0) = x0 is given, the BSDEs is short for a kind of backward SDEs with a given
terminal condition y(T ) = ξ. And BSDE admits a pair of adapted solution (y(·), z(·)) under
some conditions, where the additional term z(·) may be interpreted as a risk-adjustment factor
and is required for the equation to have adapted solution. The linear version of this type of
equation was first introduced by Bismut [4] as the adjoint equation in the stochastic maximum
principle. General nonlinear BSDEs, introduced independently by Pardoux and Peng [26] and
Duffie and Epstein [11], have received considerable research attention in recent years due to their
nice structure and wide applicability in a number of different areas, especially in mathematical
finance, optimal control and differential games. El Karoui et al. [12] discussed different proper-
ties of BSDEs and their application to finance. Two recent monographs about BSDEs can be
seen in Pardoux and Ra˘s¸canu [27] and Zhang [48].
The optimal control problem of BSDEs was first studied by Peng [28, 29] and El Karoui
et al. [12], when solving the recursive utility maximization problems. Dokuchaev and Zhou [8]
studied a stochastic control problem where the system dynamics is a controlled nonlinear BSDE.
Kohlmann and Zhou [18] explored the relationship between BSDEs and stochastic controls by in-
terpreting BSDEs as some stochastic optimal control problems. Chen and Zhou [6] investigated
an optimization model of stochastic LQ regulators with indefinite control cost weighting matri-
ces, involving a backward LQ problem. Lim and Zhou [21] studied an optimal control of linear
BSDEs with a quadratic cost criteria, and the solution is obtained by using the completion-of-
squares technique. Huang et al. [14] studied a partial information control problem of backward
stochastic systems, and obtained a new stochastic maximum principle. Shi [30] investigated an
optimal control problem for systems described by BSDEs with time delayed generators, and
proved a sufficient maximum principle. The mean-field BSDE was firstly introduced by Buck-
dahn et al. [5]. Ma and Liu [23] investigated an optimal control of an infinite horizon system
governed by mean-field BSDE with delay and partial information, and establish the existence
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and uniqueness results for a mean-field BSDE with average delay. Li et al. [20] studied the LQ
optimal control problem for mean-filed BSDEs.
When it comes to the differential game problem of BSDEs, Hamadene and Lepeltier [13]
discussed a stochastic zero-sum differential games of the results on BSDEs, and obtained the
existence of a saddle point in the bounded case under the Isaacs’ condition. Yu and Ji [47]
studied an existence and uniqueness result for an initial coupled FBSDE under some monotone
conditions, which was applied to backward LQ non-zero sum stochastic differential game prob-
lem. Wang and Yu [39] established a necessary condition and a sufficient condition in the form
of maximum principle for open-loop equilibrium point of the game systems described by the
BSDEs. Wang and Yu [40] continued to establish a necessary condition in the form of maximum
principle for open-loop Nash equilibrium point of this type of partial information game, and
then gave a verification theorem which is a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium point. Shi
and Wang [31] investigated a non-zero sum differential game, where the state dynamics follows
a BSDE with time-delayed generator, and an Arrow’s sufficient condition for open-loop equilib-
rium point is proved. Huang et al. [15] studied a backward mean-field linear-quadratic-Gaussian
games of weakly coupled stochastic large-population system, and two classes of foregoing games
are discussed and their decentralized strategies are derived through the consistency condition.
Huang and Wang [16] discussed a kind of non-zero sum differential game of mean-field BSDE.
Wang et al. [38] studied a kind of LQ non-zero sum differential game driven by BSDE with
asymmetric information. Aurell [1] studied a mean-field type games between two players with
backward stochastic dynamics, and made up a class of non-zero sum, non-cooperating, differ-
ential games where the players’ state dynamics solve a BSDE that depends on the marginal
distributions of player states. Du et al. [9] studied the mean-field game of N weakly-coupled
linear BSDE system. Du and Wu [10] investigated a new kind of Stackelberg differential game
of mean-field BSDEs. Huang et al. [17] focused on a kind of non-zero sum differential game
driven by mean-field BSDE with asymmetric information.
Inspired by the above literatures, in this paper we study the Stackelberg game of BSDEs with
partial information, where the coefficients of the backward game system and cost functionals are
deterministic, and the control domain is convex. In our framework, we set that the information
filtration available to the leader is the complete information filtration naturally generated by the
random noise source, and the information filtration available to the follower is based on the sub-
σ-algebra of that available to the leader. The novelty of the formulation and the contribution in
this paper is the following. (1) A new kind of general Stackelberg game of BSDEs with partial
information is introduced and studied by the maximum principle approach, where a terminal
condition ξ is given in advance. For the follower’s problem, the partial information maximum
principle and verification theorem are given, which are direct from Theorem 2.1 and Theorem
2.3 of Wang and Yu [40]. For the leader’s problem, the partial information maximum principle
could be derived via the similar technique in Zuo and Min [49] which, however, did not give the
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corresponding sufficient condition. Therefore, in our paper, the partial information verification
theorem is derived, by the Clarke generalized gradient. (2) For the LQ case, it consists of
a stochastic optimal control problem of BSDE with partial information for the follower, and
followed by a stochastic optimal control problem of coupled conditional mean-field forward-
backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) with complete information for the leader,
which is different from that in the (forward) Stackelberg differential game studied in Shi et
al. [34]. (3) For giving the state estimate feedback representations for the optimal control of
the follower, two Riccati equations, a linear backward stochastic differential filtering equation
(BSDFE), and a linear stochastic differential filtering equation (SDFE) are introduced. See
Theorem 4.1. Then, four high-dimensional Riccati equations, a linear BSDFE, and a linear SDFE
are introduced to represent the optimal control of the leader as the state estimate feedback form.
See Theorem 4.2. (4) A pension fund problem of two players with asymmetric information in
the financial market is studied, the Stackelberg equilibrium point is represented and the optimal
initial wealth reserve is obtained explicitly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the general Stackelberg game of
BSDEs with partial information is formulated. Then this general problem is studied in Section 3.
The follower’s problem of the BSDE with partial information is considered first in Subsection 3.1,
while the leader’s problem of the conditional mean-field FBSDE is studied in Subsection 3.2. By
the partial information maximum principle approach, necessary and sufficient conditions for the
optimal controls of the follower and the leader’s are given, respectively. Then the LQ Stackelberg
game problem with partial information is investigated in Section 4. Specially, Subsection 4.1
is devoted to the solution of an LQ stochastic optimal control problem of BSDE with partial
information of the follower, via two Riccati equations, a BSDFE and a SDFE, the optimal
control of the follower is given in the state feedback form. Subsection 4.2 is devoted to the
solution of an LQ stochastic optimal control problem of coupled conditional mean-field FBSDE
with complete information of the leader, the optimal control of the leader is represented as the
state feedback form by the solutions to four new high-dimensional Riccati equations, a BSDFE
and a SDFE. In Section 5, the theoretic results in the previous sections are applied to a pension
fund management problem of two players with asymmetric information in the financial market.
Finally, Section 6 gives some concluding remarks.
2 Problem Formulation
In this paper, we use Rn to denote the Euclidean space of n-dimensional vectors, Rn×d to denote
the space of n× d matrices, and Sn to denote the space of n× n symmetric matrices. 〈·, ·〉 and
| · | are used to denote the scalar product and norm in the Euclidean space, respectively. A ⊤
appearing in the superscript of a matrix, denotes its transpose. fx, fxx denote the first- and
second-order partial derivatives with respect to x for a differentiable function f , respectively.
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Let T > 0 be fixed. Consider a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P) and two standardm(m˜)-
dimensional Brownian motions W (t) and W˜ (t) with W (0) = W˜ (0) = 0, which generates the
filtration Ft = σ{W (r), W˜ (r) : 0 ≤ r ≤ t} augmented by all the P-null sets in F . L
2
FT
(Ω,Rn)
denotes the set of Rn-valued, FT -measurable, square-integrable random vectors, L
2
F (0, T ;R
n)
denotes the set of Rn-valued, Ft-adapted, square integrable processes on [0, T ], L
2
F (0, T ;R
n×d)
denotes the set of n × d-matrix-valued, Ft-adapted, square integrable processes on [0, T ], and
L∞(0, T ;Rn×d) denotes the set of n× d-matrix-valued, bounded functions on [0, T ].
Let us consider the following controlled BSDE:
−dyv1,v2(t) = f(t, yv1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), z˜v1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t))dt
− z(t)v1,v2dW (t)− z˜v1,v2(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
yv1,v2(T ) = ξ,
(2.1)
where f : [0, T ] × Rn × Rn×m × Rn×m˜ × Rk1 × Rk2 → Rn is a given continuous function in
(t, y, z, z˜, v1, v2) and ξ ∈ L
2
FT
(Ω,Rn) is given. v1(·) ∈ U1 is the control process of the follower,
and v2(·) ∈ U2 is the control process of the leader, where Ui is a nonempty convex subset of
R
ki , i = 1, 2. In the backward game system (2.1), the two players work together to achieve a
common goal ξ at the terminal time T .
Let Git ⊆ Ft be a given sub-filtration which represents the information available to the
follower and the leader at time t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, respectively, and G1t ⊆ G
2
t ⊆ Ft. We define
the admissible control sets by
Ui[0, T ] =
{
vi(·) ∈ L
2
Gi(0, T ;R
ki)
∣∣vi(t) ∈ Ui, t ∈ [0, T ], a.e, a.s.}, i = 1, 2, (2.2)
respectively.
We define the cost functionals of the follower and the leader as
Ji(v1(·), v2(·); ξ) = E
[∫ T
0
Li(t, y
v1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), z˜v1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t))dt + hi(y
v1,v2(0))
]
, (2.3)
for i = 1, 2. Here Li : [0, T ]×R
n×Rn×m×Rn×m˜×Rk1×Rk2 → R are given continuous functions
in (t, y, z, z˜, v1, v2) and hi : R
n → R are given continuous functions, for i = 1, 2. We remark
that the cost functional (2.3) describe that the players have their own benefits except for the
terminal common goal ξ.
Now, we give some assumptions that will be in force through this paper.
(A1) The function f is continuously differentiable in (y, z, z˜, v1, v2). Moreover, the partial
derivatives fy, fz, fz˜, fv1 and fv2 with respect to y, z, z˜, v1 and v2 are uniformly bounded.
From Pardoux and Peng [26], it is easy to see that if both v1(·) ∈ U1[0, T ], v2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ],
and (A1) holds, then BSDE (2.1) admits a unique solution triple (yv1,v2(·), zv1 ,v2(·), z˜v1 ,v2(·)) ∈
L2F (0, T ;R
n)× L2F (0, T ;R
n×m)× L2F (0, T ;R
n×m˜), which we called the state trajectory.
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(A2) Li is continuously differentiable with respect to (y, z, z˜, v1, v2) and hi is continuously
differentiable in y, i = 1, 2. Moreover, there exists a constant C such that Liy, Liz, Liz˜, Liv1 , Liv2
are bounded by C(1 + |y|+ |z|+ |z˜|+ |v1|+ |v2|), and hiy is bounded by C(1 + |y|), i = 1, 2.
The problem studied in this paper is proposed in the following definition.
Definition 2.1. The pair (v¯1(·), v¯2(·)) ∈ U1[0, T ] × U2[0, T ] is called an optimal solution to the
Stackelberg game of BSDEs with partial information, if it satisfies the following condition:
(i) For given ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω,R
n) and any v2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ], there exists a map Γ : U2[0, T ] ×
L2FT (Ω,R
n)→ U1[0, T ] such that
J1(Γ(v2(·), ξ), v2(·); ξ) = min
v1(·)∈U1[0,T ]
J1(v1(·), v2(·); ξ). (2.4)
(ii) There exists a unique v¯2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ] such that
J2(Γ(v¯2(·), ξ), v¯2(·); ξ) = min
v2(·)∈U2[0,T ]
J2(Γ(v¯2(·), ξ), v2(·); ξ). (2.5)
(iii) The optimal strategy of the follower is v¯1(·) = Γ(v¯2(·), ξ).
We call the above problem a Stackelberg game of BSDE with partial information.
3 The General Problem
3.1 Optimization for The Follower
In this subsection, we seek the necessary and sufficient conditions of the partial information
optimal control for the follower.
Let ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω,R
n) be given, giving the leader’s strategy v2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ]. Let v¯1(·) be
an optimal control of the follower, and (yv¯1,v2(·), zv¯1,v2(·), z˜v¯1 ,v2(·)) be the corresponding state
trajectory. Let the process x(·) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
n) satisfy the following adjoint equation:
dx(t) =−H1y(t, y
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1,v2(t), z˜v¯1,v2(t), v¯1(t), v2(t), x(t))dt
−H1z(t, y
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1,v2(t), z˜v¯1,v2(t), v¯1(t), v2(t), x(t))dW (t)
−H1z˜(t, y
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1,v2(t), z˜v¯1,v2(t), v¯1(t), v2(t), x(t))dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
x(0) = h1y(y
v¯1,v2(0)),
(3.1)
where H1y,H1z and H1z˜ denote the partial derivatives of H1 with respect to y, z and z˜, respec-
tively, and the Hamiltonian function H1 : [0, T ]×R
n ×Rn×m ×Rn×m˜ ×Rk1 ×Rk2 ×Rn → R is
defined as
H1(t, y, z, z˜, v1, v2, x) = −L1(t, y, z, z˜, v1, v2)− 〈f(t, y, z, z˜, v1, v2), x〉. (3.2)
The following two results are direct from Theorems 2.1 and 2.3 of Wang and Yu [40].
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Theorem 3.1. (Partial information maximum principle for the follower) Let (A1), (A2) hold
and ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω,R
n). Giving the leader’s strategy v2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ]. Let v¯1(·) ∈ U1[0, T ] be
an optimal control of the follower and (yv¯1,v2(·), zv¯1,v2(·), z˜v¯1 ,v2(·)) be the corresponding state
trajectory. Then we have
E
[〈
H1v1(t, y
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1,v2(t), z˜v¯1,v2(t), v¯1(t), v2(t), x(t)), v1 − v¯1(t)
〉∣∣G1t ] ≤ 0, (3.3)
for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., for any v1 ∈ U1, where x(·) is the solution to the adjoint equation (3.1).
Theorem 3.2. (Partial information verification theorem for the follower) Let (A1), (A2)
hold and ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω,R
n). Giving the leader’s strategy v2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ]. Assume that L1 is
continuously differentiable in v1, let v¯1 ∈ U1[0, T ] be given such that
L1y(t, y
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1 ,v2(t), z˜v¯1,v2(t), v¯1(t), v2(t)),
L1z(t, y
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1,v2(t), z˜v¯1,v2(t), v¯1(t), v2(t)),
L1z˜(t, y
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1,v2(t), z˜v¯1,v2(t), v¯1(t), v2(t)),
L1v1(t, y
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1,v2(t), z˜v¯1,v2(t), v¯1(t), v2(t)) ∈ L
2
F (0, T ).
For any (t, v1) ∈ [0, T ] × U1, L1 satisfies E
∫ T
0 |L1v1(t, y
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1,v2(t), z˜v¯1,v2(t), v1, v2(t))|dt <
+∞. Suppose that the adjoint equation (3.1) admits a solution x(·) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
n), and
E
[
H1(t, y
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1,v2(t), z˜v¯1,v2(t), v¯1(t), v2(t), x(t))
∣∣G1t ]
= max
v1∈U1
E
[
H1(t, y
v1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), z˜v1,v2(t), v1, v2(t), x(t))
∣∣G1t ], for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.4)
Moreover, suppose E[H1v1(t, y
v1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), z˜v1 ,v2(t), v1, v2(t), x(t))|G
1
t ] is continuous at v1 =
v¯1(t) for any t ∈ [0, T ]. Suppose for all t ∈ [0, T ], H1(t, ·, ·, ·, ·, v2(t), x(t)) is concave, and h1(·)
is convex. Then v¯1(·) is an optimal control of the follower.
3.2 Optimization for the leader
In this subsection, we firstly restate the partial information stochastic optimal control problem
of the leader in detail.
For any v2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ], by the maximum condition (3.3), we assume that a functional
v¯1(t) = v¯1(t, yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t), zˆv¯1,vˆ2(t), ˆ˜zv¯1,vˆ2(t), vˆ2(t), xˆ(t)) is uniquely defined, where{
yˆv¯1,vˆ2(t) = E[yv¯1,v2(t)|G1t ], zˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t) = E[zv¯1,v2(t)|G1t ], ˆ˜z
v¯1,vˆ2(t) = E[z˜v¯1,v2(t)|G1t ],
vˆ2(t) = E[v2(t)|G
1
t ], xˆ(t) = E[x(t)|G
1
t ].
(3.5)
Then, substituting v¯1(t) into the game system (2.1), and combining it with the corresponding
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adjoint equation (3.1), we derive the following FBSDE
−dyv2(t) = fL(t, yv2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))dt− z
v2(t)dW (t)− z˜v2(t)dW˜ (t),
dx(t) =
[
fLy (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))
⊤x(t)
+ LL1y(t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))
]
dt
+
[
fLz (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))
⊤x(t)
+ LL1z(t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))
]
dW (t)
+
[
fLz˜ (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))
⊤x(t)
+ LL1z˜(t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))
]
dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
x(0) = h1y(y
v2(0)), yv2(T ) = ξ,
(3.6)
where for the simplicity of notations, we have denoted yv2(·) = yv¯1,v2(·), zv2(·) = zv¯1,v2(·), z˜v2(·) =
z˜v¯1,v2(·), and have defined ΦL on [0, T ]× Rn × Rn×m × Rn×m˜ × U2 as
ΦL(t, yv2(·), zv2(·), z˜v2(·), v2(t))
:= Φ(t, yv¯1,v2(·), zv¯1 ,v2(·), z˜v¯1,v2(·), v¯1(t, yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t), zˆv¯1,vˆ2(t), ˆ˜zv¯1,vˆ2(t), vˆ2(t), xˆ(t)), v2(t)),
for Φ = f, L1, respectively. Then we redefine
J˜2(v2(·); ξ) := J2(v¯1(·), v2(·); ξ)
= E
[ ∫ T
0
L2(t, y
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1,v2(t), z˜v¯1,v2(t), v¯1(t, yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t), zˆv¯1 ,vˆ2(t), ˆ˜zv¯1 ,vˆ2(t), vˆ2(t), xˆ(t)), v2(t))dt
+ h2(y
v¯1,v2(0))
]
:= E
[ ∫ T
0
LL2 (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))dt+ h2(y
v2(0))
]
,
(3.7)
where LL2 : [0, T ] × R
n × Rn×m × Rn×m˜ × U2 → R is similarly defined as above. The target of
the leader is to find an optimal control v¯2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ].
Suppose that there exists an optimal control v¯2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ] for the leader, and the corre-
sponding “state trajectory” (yv¯1,v¯2(·), zv¯1 ,v¯2(·), z˜v¯1,v¯2(·), x¯(·)) is the solution to (3.6). Define the
Hamiltonian function of the leader H2 : [0, T ]×R
n ×Rn×m×Rn×m˜×Rk2 ×Rn×Rn ×Rn×m×
R
n×m˜ × Rn → R as
H2(t, y
v2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2, x, p, q1, q2, Q) =
〈
bL(t, yv2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2), p
〉
+
〈
σL1 (t, y
v2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2), q1
〉
+
〈
σL2 (t, y
v2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2), q2
〉
+
〈
fL(t, yv2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2), Q
〉
+ LL2 (t, y
v2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2),
(3.8)
where
bL(t, yv2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2) := f
L
y (t, y
v2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2)
⊤x+ LL1y(t, y
v2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2),
σL1 (t, y
v2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2) := f
L
z (t, y
v2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2)
⊤x+ LL1z(t, y
v2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2),
σL2 (t, y
v2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2) := f
L
z˜ (t, y
v2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2)
⊤x+ LL1z˜(t, y
v2 , zv2 , z˜v2 , v2).
9
Let (p(·), q1(·), q2(·), Q(·)) ∈ R
n ×Rn×m ×Rn×m˜ ×Rn be the unique Ft-adapted solution to
the adjoint FBSDE of the leader:
−dp(t) =
{
b¯Lx (t)
⊤p(t) + E
[
b¯Lxˆ (t)
⊤p(t)
∣∣G1t ]+ m∑
j=1
[
σ¯
Lj
1x (t)
⊤q
j
1(t) + E
[
σ¯
Lj
1xˆ (t)
⊤q
j
1(t)
∣∣G1t ]]
+
m˜∑
j=1
[
σ¯
Lj
2x (t)
⊤q
j
2(t) + E
[
σ¯
Lj
2xˆ (t)
⊤q
j
2(t)
∣∣G1t ]]+ f¯Lx (t)⊤Q(t) + E[f¯Lxˆ (t)⊤Q(t)∣∣G1t ]
+ L¯L2x(t)
⊤ + E
[
L¯L2xˆ(t)
⊤
∣∣G1t ]}dt− q1(t)dW (t)− q2(t)dW˜ (t),
dQ(t) =
{
b¯Ly (t)
⊤p(t) + E
[
b¯Lyˆ (t)
⊤p(t)
∣∣G1t ]+ m∑
j=1
[
σ¯
Lj
1y (t)
⊤q
j
1(t) + E
[
σ¯
Lj
1yˆ (t)
⊤q
j
1(t)
∣∣G1t ]]
+
m˜∑
j=1
[
σ¯
Lj
2y (t)
⊤q
j
2(t) + E
[
σ¯
Lj
2yˆ (t)
⊤q
j
2(t)
∣∣G1t ]]+ f¯Ly (t)⊤Q(t) + E[f¯Lyˆ (t)⊤Q(t)∣∣G1t ]
+ L¯L2y(t)
⊤ + E
[
L¯L2yˆ(t)
⊤
∣∣G1t ]}dt
+
{
b¯Lz (t)
⊤p(t) + E
[
b¯Lzˆ (t)
⊤p(t)
∣∣G1t ]+ m∑
j=1
[
σ¯
Lj
1z (t)
⊤q
j
1(t) + E
[
σ¯
Lj
1zˆ (t)
⊤q
j
1(t)
∣∣G1t ]]
+
m˜∑
j=1
[
σ¯
Lj
2z (t)
⊤q
j
2(t) + E
[
σ¯
Lj
2zˆ (t)
⊤q
j
2(t)
∣∣G1t ]]+ f¯Lz (t)⊤Q(t) + E[f¯Lzˆ (t)⊤Q(t)∣∣G1t ]
+ L¯L2z(t)
⊤ + E
[
L¯L2zˆ(t)
⊤
∣∣G1t ]}dW (t)
+
{
b¯Lz˜ (t)
⊤p(t) + E
[
b¯Lˆ˜z (t)
⊤p(t)
∣∣G1t ]+ m∑
j=1
[
σ¯
Lj
1z˜ (t)
⊤q
j
1(t) + E
[
σ¯
Lj
1ˆ˜z
(t)⊤qj1(t)
∣∣G1t ]]
+
m˜∑
j=1
[
σ¯
Lj
2z˜ (t)
⊤q
j
2(t) + E
[
σ¯
Lj
2ˆ˜z
(t)⊤qj2(t)
∣∣G1t ]]+ f¯Lz˜ (t)⊤Q(t) + E[f¯Lˆ˜z (t)⊤Q(t)∣∣G1t ]
+ L¯L2z˜(t)
⊤ + E
[
L¯L
2ˆ˜z
(t)⊤
∣∣G1t ]}dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
p(T ) = 0, Q(0) = h2y(y
v¯2(0)) + p(0)h1yy(y
v¯2(0)),
(3.9)
where we have used Φ¯L(t) = ΦL(t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t)) for Φ = b, σ1, σ2, L1, L2 and all
their derivatives.
Now, we obtain the following theorems for the leader.
Theorem 3.3. (Partial information maximum principle for the leader) Suppose (A1), (A2)
holds, let v¯2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ] be an optimal control of the leader and (y
v¯2(·), zv¯2(·), z˜v¯2(·), x¯(·)) be the
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corresponding optimal state trajectory. Let (p(·), q1(·), q2(·), Q(·)) be the solution to (3.9), then
E
[〈
H2v2(t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)), v2 − v¯2(t)
〉
+
〈
E
[
H2vˆ2(t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t))
∣∣G1t ], vˆ2 − ˆ¯v2(t)〉∣∣G2t ]
≥ 0, for any v2 ∈ U2, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
(3.10)
Proof. The maximum condition (3.10) is similar to that in Theorem 2.3 of Shi et al. [32], which
can be obtained applying the convex variation and adjoint technique. We omit the detail for
the space limit. See also Zuo and Min [49], Wang et al. [37] for optimal control problems of
mean-field FBSDEs with partial information.
Theorem 3.4. (Partial information verification theorem for the leader) Let (A1), (A2) hold,
v¯2(·) ∈ U2 and (y
v¯2(·), zv¯2(·), z˜v¯2(·), x¯(·)) be the corresponding state trajectory with h1yy(y) ≡
h¯1 ∈ S
n. Let (p(·), q1(·), q2(·), Q(·)) be the solution to (3.9). For each t ∈ [0, T ], suppose that H2
is convex in (y, z, z˜, v2, x) and h2 is convex in y, and
E
[
H2(t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t))
+ E
[
H2(t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t))
∣∣G1t ]∣∣∣G2t ]
= min
v2∈U2
E
[
H2(t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2, x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t))
+ E
[
H2(t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2, x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t))
∣∣G1t ]∣∣∣G2t ],
(3.11)
holds for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., then v¯2(·) is an optimal control of the leader.
Before we prove this theorem, let us review some preliminaries of the Clarke generalized
gradient, which was used to derive sufficient conditions in Yong and Zhou [46].
Let M : X → R be a locally Lipschitz continuous function, where X is a convex set in Rn.
Definition 3.1. The Clarke generalized gradient of M at xˆ ∈ X , denoted by ∂M(xˆ), is a set
defined by
∂M(xˆ) :=
{
ζ ∈ Rn; 〈ζ, ξ〉 ≤ lim sup
x∈X ,x+hξ∈X ,x→xˆ,h→0+
M(x+ hξ)−M(x)
h
, ∀ ξ ∈ Rn
}
.
Lemma 3.1. The following properties hold:
(1) ∂M(xˆ) is a nonempty convex set and satisfying ∂(−M)(xˆ) = −∂M(xˆ).
(2) For any set N ⊂ X of measure zero,
∂M(xˆ) = co
{
lim
i→∞
Mx(xi) :M is differentiable at xi, xi 6∈ N and xi → xˆ
}
,
where “co” denotes the convex hull of a set.
(3) If xˆ attains the maximum or minimum of M over X , then 0 ∈ ∂M(xˆ).
(4) If M is a convex (respectively, concave) function, then p ∈ ∂M(xˆ) if and only if
M(x)−M(xˆ) ≥
(
respectively, ≤
)
〈p, x− xˆ〉, ∀x ∈ X .
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Lemma 3.2. Let ρ(·, ·) be a convex or concave function on Rd×U with U ⊆ Rk being a convex
body. Assume that ρ(x, u) is Lipschitz continuous in u, differentiable in x, and ρx(x, u) is
continuous in (x, u). For a given (x¯, u¯) ∈ Rd×U , if r ∈ ∂uρ(x¯, u¯), then (ρx(x¯, u¯), r) ∈ ∂x,uρ(x¯, u¯).
Proof of Theorem 3.4. By the condition (3.11) and Lemma 3.1-(3), we have
0 ∈ E
[
∂v2H2
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
+ E
[
∂vˆ2H2
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)∣∣G1t ]∣∣G2t ]. (3.12)
By Lemma 3.2, we further conclude that(
H2x,xˆ,H2y,yˆ,H2z,zˆ,H2z˜,ˆ˜z, 0
)
∈ ∂x,xˆ,y,yˆ,z,zˆ,z˜,ˆ˜z,v2,vˆ2H2
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
,
(3.13)
where
H2Φ,Φˆ : = H2Φ,Φˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
= b¯LΦ(t)
⊤p(t) + E
[
b¯L
Φˆ
(t)⊤p(t)
∣∣G1t ]+ m∑
j=1
[
σ¯
Lj
1Φ(t)
⊤q
j
1(t) + E
[
σ¯
Lj
1Φˆ
(t)⊤qj1(t)
∣∣G1t ]]
+
m˜∑
j=1
[
σ¯
Lj
2Φ(t)
⊤q
j
2(t) + E
[
σ¯
Lj
2Φˆ
(t)⊤qj2(t)
∣∣G1t ]]+ f¯LΦ (t)⊤Q(t) + E[f¯LΦˆ (t)⊤Q(t)∣∣G1t ]
+ L¯L2Φ(t)
⊤ + E
[
L¯L
2Φˆ
(t)⊤
∣∣G1t ], for Φ = x, y, z, z˜.
Since H2 is convex in (x, xˆ, y, yˆ, z, zˆ, z˜, ˆ˜z, v2, v¯2), one obtains∫ T
0
{
H2
(
t, yv2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t), x(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
−H2
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)}
dt
≥
∫ T
0
{〈
H2x,xˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, xv2(t)− xv¯2(t)
〉
+
〈
H2y,yˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, yv2(t)− yv¯2(t)
〉
+
〈
H2z,zˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, zv2(t)− zv¯2(t)
〉
+
〈
H2z˜,ˆ˜z
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, z˜v2(t)− z˜v¯2(t)
〉}
dt.
(3.14)
For any v2(·) ∈ U2, then we consider
J˜2(v2(·); ξ) − J˜2(v¯2(·); ξ) = I + II,
with
I = E
∫ T
0
[
LL2 (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))− L
L
2 (t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
]
dt,
II = E
[
h2(y
v2(0))− h2(y
v¯2(0))
]
.
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Since h2 is convex in y, we get
II ≥ E
[〈
h2y(y
v¯2(0)), yv2(0) − yv¯2(0)
〉]
. (3.15)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to −〈Q(·), yv2(·)−yv¯2(·)〉, then taking expectation on both sides, we have
E
[
〈Q(0), yv2(0)− yv¯2(0)〉 − 〈Q(T ), yv2(T )− yv¯2(T )〉
]
= E
∫ T
0
{
−
〈
H2y,yˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, yv2(t)− yv¯2(t)
〉
−
〈
H2z,zˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, zv2(t)− zv¯2(t)
〉
−
〈
H2z˜,ˆ˜z
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, z˜v2(t)− z˜v¯2(t)
〉
+
〈
Q(t), fL(t, yv2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t)) − f
L(t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
〉}
dt.
Similarly, we get
E
[
〈p(0), xv2(0)− xv¯2(0)〉 − 〈p(T ), xv2(T )− xv¯2(T )〉
]
= E
∫ T
0
{
〈H2x,xˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, xv2(t)− xv¯2(t)〉
− 〈p(t), bL(t, yv2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))− b
L(t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))〉
− 〈q1(t), σ
L
1 (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t)) − σ
L
1 (t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))〉
− 〈q2(t), σ
L
2 (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t)) − σ
L
2 (t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))〉
}
dt.
With the help of the initial value and terminal value of Q(·) and p(·), respectively, in the equation
(3.9), and the condition h1yy(y) ≡ h¯1, we have
E
[〈
h2y(y
v¯2(0)), yv2(0) − yv¯2(0)
〉
+
〈
p(0)h¯1, y
v2(0)− yv¯2(0)
〉]
= E
∫ T
0
{
−
〈
H2y,yˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, yv2(t)− yv¯2(t)
〉
−
〈
H2z,zˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, zv2(t)− zv¯2(t)
〉
−
〈
H2z˜,ˆ˜z
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, z˜v2(t)− z˜v¯2(t)
〉
+
〈
Q(t), fL(t, yv2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t)) − f
L(t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
〉}
dt,
(3.16)
and
E
[
〈p(0)h¯1, y
v2(0) − yv¯2(0)〉
]
≤ E
[
〈p(0), h1y(y
v2(0))− h1y(y
v¯2(0))〉
]
= E
[
〈p(0), xv2(0)− xv¯2(0)〉
]
= E
∫ T
0
{〈
H2x,xˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, xv2(t)− xv¯2(t)
〉
−
〈
p(t), bL(t, yv2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))− b
L(t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
〉
−
〈
q1(t), σ
L
1 (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))− σ
L
1 (t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
〉
−
〈
q2(t), σ
L
2 (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))− σ
L
2 (t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
〉}
dt.
(3.17)
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Putting (3.17) into (3.16), we derive the following inequality
E
〈
h2y(y
v¯2(0)), yv2(0)− yv¯2(0)
〉
≥ E
∫ T
0
{
−
〈
H2x,xˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, xv2(t)− xv¯2(t)
〉
−
〈
H2y,yˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, xv2(t)− xv¯2(t)
〉
−
〈
H2z,zˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, zv2(t)− zv¯2(t)
〉
−
〈
H2z˜,ˆ˜z
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, z˜v2(t)− z˜v¯2(t)
〉
+
〈
Q(t), fL(t, yv2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))− f
L(t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
〉
+
〈
p(t), bL(t, yv2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t)) − b
L(t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
〉
+
〈
q1(t), σ
L
1 (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))− σ
L
1 (t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
〉
+
〈
q2(t), σ
L
2 (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))− σ
L
2 (t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
〉}
dt
= E
∫ T
0
{
−
〈
H2x,xˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, xv2(t)− xv¯2(t)
〉
−
〈
H2y,yˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, xv2(t)− xv¯2(t)〉
−
〈
H2z,zˆ
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, zv2(t)− zv¯2(t)〉
−
〈
H2z˜,ˆ˜z
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
, z˜v2(t)− z˜v¯2(t)〉
+H2
(
t, yv2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t), x(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
−H2
(
t, yv¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), q1(t), q2(t), Q(t)
)
− LL2 (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t)) + L
L
2 (t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
}
dt.
(3.18)
Because of (3.14), we get
II ≥ E
〈
h2y(y
v¯2(0)), yv2(0)− yv¯2(0)
〉
≥ E
∫ T
0
{
− LL2 (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t)) + L
L
2 (t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
}
dt.
(3.19)
Therefore, we have
J˜2(v2(·); ξ) − J˜2(v¯2(·); ξ)
≥ E
∫ T
0
{
LL2 (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t))− L
L
2 (t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t))
}
dt
+ E
∫ T
0
{
− LL2 (t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), z˜v2(t), v2(t)) + L
L
2 (t, y
v¯2(t), zv¯2(t), z˜v¯2(t), v¯2(t)
}
dt = 0.
Since v2(·) ∈ U2 is arbitrary, the desired result follows. 
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4 The Linear Quadratic Problem
In this section, we aim to study an LQ case with m = m˜ = 1 and to give some explicit
forms of the previous results. Moreover, we only consider the special case when the follower’s
information filtration is G1t = σ{W (r) : 0 ≤ r ≤ t}, and the leader’s information filtration is
G2t = Ft = σ{W (r), W˜ (r) : 0 ≤ r ≤ t}.
4.1 Optimization for The Follower
We consider the following controlled linear BSDE
−dyv1,v2(t) =
[
A(t)yv1,v2(t) +B1(t)v1(t) +B2(t)v2(t) + C1(t)z
v1,v2(t)
+ C2(t)z˜
v1,v2(t)
]
dt− zv1,v2(t)dW (t)− z˜v1,v2(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
yv1,v2(T ) = ξ,
(4.1)
and the cost functional
J1(v1(·), v2(·); ξ) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[〈
Q1(t)y
v1,v2(t), yv1,v2(t)
〉
+
〈
R1(t)v1(t), v1(t)
〉
+
〈
S1(t)z
v1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t)
〉
+
〈
S2(t)z˜
v1,v2(t), z˜v1,v2(t)
〉]
dt+
〈
G1y
v1,v2(0), yv1,v2(0)
〉}
,
(4.2)
whereA(·), B1(·), B2(·), C1(·), C2(·), Q1(·), R1(·), S1(·), S2(·) are deterministic matrix-valued func-
tions, and G1 is an R
n-valued vector. We give the following assumptions.
(L1) {
A(·), C1(·), C2(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Rn×n),
B1(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Rn×k1), B2(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Rn×k2).
(L2) {
Q1(·), S1(·), S2(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Sn), Q1(·), S1(·), S2(·) ≥ 0,
R1(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Sk1), R1(·) > 0, G1 ∈ S
n, G1 ≥ 0.
For the given control v2(·), suppose that there exists a G
1
t -adapted optimal control v¯1(·) of
the follower, and the corresponding optimal state is (yv¯1,v2(·), zv¯1 ,v2(·)). According to Theorem
3.1, it is necessary to satisfy
E
[
H1v1(t, y
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1,v2(t), z˜v¯1,v2(t), v¯1(t), v2(t), x(t))
∣∣G1t ] = 0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., (4.3)
where the Hamiltonian function of the follower is
H1(t, y, z, z˜, v1, v2, x) =−
1
2
〈Q1(t)y, y〉 −
1
2
〈R1(t)v1, v1〉 −
1
2
〈S1(t)z, z〉 −
1
2
〈S2(t)z˜, z˜〉
− 〈A(t)y +B1(t)v1 +B2(t)v2 + C1(t)z + C2(t)z˜, x〉.
(4.4)
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Then we have
v¯1(t) = −R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤xˆ(t), a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., (4.5)
where (yv¯1,v2(·), zv¯1 ,v2(·), z˜v¯1 ,v2(·), x(·)) satisfies
−dyv¯1,v2(t) =
[
A(t)yv¯1,v2(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤xˆ(t) +B2(t)v2(t) + C1(t)z
v¯1,v2(t)
+ C2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2(t)
]
dt− zv¯1,v2(t)dW (t)− z˜v¯1,v2(t)dW˜ (t),
dx(t) =
[
A(t)⊤x(t) +Q(t)yv¯1,v2(t)
]
dt+
[
C1(t)
⊤x(t) + S1(t)z
v¯1,v2(t)
]
dW (t)
+
[
C2(t)
⊤x(t) + S2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2(t)
]
dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
x(0) = G1y
v¯1,v2(0), yv¯1,v2(T ) = ξ.
(4.6)
We then wish to obtain the state estimate feedback form of v¯1(·), from (4.5). Therefore we
set
yv¯1,v2(t) = −P1(t)x(t)− φ(t), (4.7)
for some deterministic and differentiable Rn×n-matrix-valued function P1(·) with P1(T ) = 0,
and Rn-valued, Ft-adapted process φ(·) which admits the following BSDE:{
dφ(t) = Γ(t)dt+ η(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
φ(T ) = −ξ.
(4.8)
In the above equation, Γ(·), η(·) are both Rn-valued, Ft-adapted processes, which are to be
determined later. Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (4.7), we get
dyv¯1,v2(t) =
[
− P˙1(t)x(t) − P1(t)A(t)
⊤x(t) + P1(t)Q1(t)P1(t)x(t) + P1(t)Q1(t)φ(t)
− Γ(t)
]
dt+
[
− P1(t)(C1(t)
⊤x(t) + S1(t)z
v¯1,v2(t))− η(t)
]
dW (t)
+
[
− P1(t)(C2(t)
⊤x(t) + S2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2(t))
]
dW˜ (t).
(4.9)
Comparing (4.9) with the first equation of (4.6), we derive[
−A(t)P1(t)− P˙1(t)− P1(t)A(t)
⊤ + P1(t)Q1(t)P1(t)
]
x(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤xˆ(t)
+B2(t)v2(t) + C1(t)z
v¯1,v2(t) + C2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2(t) +
[
P1(t)Q1(t)−A(t)
]
φ(t) = Γ(t),
(4.10)
and {
zv¯1,v2(t) = −(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤x(t)− (P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1η(t),
z˜v¯1,v2(t) = −(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C2(t)
⊤x(t).
(4.11)
Taking E[·|G1t ] on both sides of (4.7), (4.8), (4.10) and (4.11), we get{
yˆv¯1,vˆ2(t) = −P1(t)xˆ(t)− φˆ(t),
dφˆ(t) = Γˆ(t)dt+ ηˆ(t)dW (t), φˆ(T ) = −ξ,
(4.12)
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Γˆ(t) =
[
− P˙1(t)−A(t)P1(t)− P1(t)A(t)
⊤ + P1(t)Q1(t)P1(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤
]
xˆ(t)
+B2(t)vˆ2(t) + C1(t)zˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t) + C2(t)ˆ˜z
v¯1,vˆ2(t) +
[
P1(t)Q1(t)−A(t)
]
φˆ(t),
(4.13)
and {
zˆv¯1,vˆ2(t) = −(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤xˆ(t)− (P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1ηˆ(t),
ˆ˜zv¯1,vˆ2(t) = −(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C2(t)
⊤xˆ(t).
(4.14)
Inserting (4.14) into (4.13), we get
Γˆ(t) =
[
− P˙1(t)−A(t)P1(t)− P1(t)A(t)
⊤ + P1(t)Q1(t)P1(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤
−C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤ − C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C2(t)
⊤
]
xˆ(t)
+B2(t)vˆ2(t)− C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1ηˆ(t) +
[
P1(t)Q1(t)−A(t)
]
φˆ(t).
(4.15)
If the following Riccati equation
P˙1(t) +A(t)P1(t) + P1(t)A(t)
⊤ − P1(t)Q1(t)P1(t) +B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤
+ C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤ + C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C2(t)
⊤ = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
P1(T ) = 0,
(4.16)
admits a unique differentiable solution P1(·), then
−dφˆ(t) =
{
− [P1(t)Q1(t)−A(t)]φˆ(t) + C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1ηˆ(t)
−B2(t)vˆ2(t)
}
dt− ηˆ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
φˆ(T ) = −ξˆ.
(4.17)
Next, we set
x(t) = P2(t)y
v¯1,v2(t) + ϕ(t), (4.18)
where P2(·) is a deterministic and differentiable R
n×n-matrix-valued function with P2(0) = G1,
and ϕ(·) is an Rn-valued, Ft-adapted process which satisfies the following SDE:{
dϕ(t) = α(t)dt + β(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
ϕ(0) = 0,
(4.19)
where α(·), β(·) are both Rn-valued, Ft-adapted processes which are to be determined later.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (4.18), we get
dx(t) =
[
P˙2(t)y
v¯1,v2(t)− P2(t)A(t)y
v¯1,v2(t) + P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤xˆ(t)
− P2(t)B2(t)v2(t)− P2(t)C1(t)z
v¯1,v2(t)− P2(t)C2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2(t) + α(t
]
dt
+
[
P2(t)z
v¯1,v2(t) + β(t)
]
dW (t) + P2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2(t)dW˜ (t).
(4.20)
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Comparing (4.20) with the second equation of (4.6), we have
α(t) =
[
− P˙2(t) + P2(t)A(t) +Q1(t)
]
yv¯1,v2(t) +A(t)⊤x(t) + P2(t)C1(t)z
v¯1,v2(t)
+ P2(t)C2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2(t)− P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤xˆ(t) + P2(t)B2(t)v2(t),
C1(t)
⊤x(t) + S1(t)z
v¯1,v2(t) = P2(t)z
v¯1,v2(t) + β(t),
C2(t)
⊤x(t) + S2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2(t) = P2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2(t).
(4.21)
Taking E[·|G1t ] on both sides of (4.18), (4.19) and (4.21), we have{
xˆ(t) = P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t) + ϕˆ(t),
dϕˆ(t) = αˆ(t)dt+ βˆ(t)dW (t), ϕˆ(0) = 0,
(4.22)
αˆ(t) =
[
− P˙2(t) + P2(t)A(t) +A(t)
⊤P2(t) +Q1(t)− P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤P2(t)
− P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤P2(t)
− P2(t)C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C2(t)
⊤P2(t)
]
yˆv¯1,vˆ2(t)
+
[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤ − P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤
− P2(t)C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C2(t)
⊤
]
ϕˆ(t)
− P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1ηˆ(t) + P2(t)B2(t)vˆ2(t),
βˆ(t) =
[
C1(t)
⊤ − (S1(t)− P2(t))(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤
]
xˆ(t)
− (S1(t)− P2(t))(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1ηˆ(t).
(4.23)
If the following Riccati equation
P˙2(t)−A(t)
⊤P2(t)− P2(t)A(t) + P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤P2(t)
+ P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤P2(t)
+ P2(t)C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C2(t)
⊤P2(t)−Q1(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
P2(0) = G1,
(4.24)
admits a unique differentiable solution P2(·), then
dϕˆ(t) =
{[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤ − P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤
− P2(t)C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C2(t)
⊤]ϕˆ(t)
− P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1ηˆ(t) + P2(t)B2(t)vˆ2(t)
}
dt
+
{[
C1(t)
⊤ − (S1(t)− P2(t))(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤
]
xˆ(t)
− (S1(t)− P2(t))(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1ηˆ(t)
}
dW (t).
(4.25)
From the above relationship between xˆ(t) and yˆv¯1,vˆ2 :{
yˆv¯1,vˆ2(t) = −P1(t)xˆ(t)− φˆ(t),
xˆ(t) = P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t) + ϕˆ(t),
(4.26)
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we get
xˆ(t) = −(I + P2(t)P1(t))
−1P2(t)φˆ(t) + (I + P2(t)P1(t))
−1ϕˆ(t). (4.27)
Putting (4.27) into (4.25), after dealing with the dW (t) term and using the fact that
(I +AB)−1A = A(I +BA)−1, for any A,B ∈ Sn,
we derive
dϕˆ(t) =
{[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤ − P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1
× P1(t)C1(t)
⊤ − P2(t)C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C2(t)
⊤
]
ϕˆ(t)
− P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1ηˆ(t) + P2(t)B2(t)vˆ2(t)
}
dt
+
{
− (I + P2(t)P1(t))(S1(t)P1(t) + I)
−1C1(t)
⊤(I + P2(t)P1(t))
−1P2(t)φˆ(t)
+ (I + P2(t)P1(t))(S1(t)P1(t) + I)
−1C1(t)
⊤(I + P2(t)P1(t))
−1ϕˆ(t)
− (S1(t)− P2(t))(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1ηˆ(t)
}
dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
ϕˆ(0) = 0.
(4.28)
Remark 4.1. We introduce two Riccati equations for P1(·) and P2(·) to build the relation
between yv¯1,v2(·) and x(·). Similarly to Lim and Zhou [21], we can obtain the unique solvability
of these two Riccati equations. And the unique solvability of (4.17) and (4.28), with the solutions
(φˆ(·), ηˆ(·)) and ϕˆ(·) respectively, is evident as they can be regarded as two kinds of linear BSDE
and SDE with bounded deterministic coefficients and square integrable nonhomogeneous terms.
We have the following result.
Theorem 4.1. Under the assumptions (L1) and (L2), for any given ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω;R
n) and
v2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ], the follower’s problem is solvable with the optimal strategy v¯1(·) being of a state
estimate feedback representation
v¯1(t) = −R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤
[
P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t) + ϕˆ(t)
]
, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., (4.29)
where P2(·) and ϕˆ(·) are the solutions to (4.24) and (4.28), respectively. The optimal state
trajectory (yˆv¯1,vˆ2(·), zˆv¯1 ,vˆ2(·), ˆ˜zv¯1 ,vˆ2(·)) is the unique solution to the following forward-backward
stochastic differential filtering equation (FBSDFE):
−dyˆv¯1,vˆ2(t) =
[
A(t)yˆv¯1,vˆ2(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)
−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤ϕˆ(t) +B2(t)vˆ2(t)
+ C1(t)zˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t) + C2(t)ˆ˜z
v¯1,vˆ2(t)
]
dt− zˆv¯1,vˆ2(t)dW (t),
dxˆ(t) =
[
A(t)⊤xˆ(t) +Q1(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)
]
dt
+
[
C1(t)
⊤xˆ(t) + S1(t)zˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)
]
dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
xˆ(0) = G1yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(0), yˆv¯1,vˆ2(T ) = ξˆ.
(4.30)
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Proof. For given ξ and v2(·), let P1(·) satisfy (4.16), by the standard BSDE theory we can solve
(4.17) to obtain (φˆ(·), ηˆ(·)). Let P2(·) satisfy (4.24), and by the standard SDE theory we can
solve (4.28) to obatin ϕˆ(·). Then according to the (4.14), (4.27) and (4.12), we can obtain
(yˆv¯1,vˆ2(·), zˆv¯1 ,vˆ2(·), ˆ˜zv¯1 ,vˆ2(·)), which are the G1t -adapted solution to (4.30). Therefore, the state
estimate feedback representation (4.29) can be obtained. The proof is complete.
4.2 Optimization for The Leader
By (4.1) and (4.29), we have
−dyv¯1,v2(t) =
[
A(t)yv¯1,v2(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 B1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 B1(t)
⊤ϕˆ(t)
+B2(t)v2(t) + C1(t)z
v¯1,v2(t) + C2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2(t)
]
dt
− zv¯1,v2(t)dW (t)− z˜v¯1,v2(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
yv¯1,v2(T ) = ξ.
(4.31)
From the relationship (4.26) and (4.14), we get{
φˆ(t) = −(P1(t)P2(t) + I)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)− P1(t)ϕˆ(t),
ηˆ(t) = −P1(t)C1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)− P1(t)C1(t)
⊤ϕˆ(t)− (P1(t)S1(t) + I)zˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t).
(4.32)
Substituting (4.32) into (4.28), we get
dϕˆ(t) =
{[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 B1(t)
⊤ − P2(t)C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)
× C2(t)
⊤
]
ϕˆ(t) + P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)
+ P2(t)C1(t)zˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t) + P2(t)B2(t)vˆ2(t)
}
dt+
[
C1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)
+ C1(t)
⊤ϕˆ(t) + (S1(t)− P2(t))zˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)
]
dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
ϕˆ(0) = 0.
(4.33)
Combining (4.31) and (4.33), we can get the state equation of the leader:
dϕˆ(t) =
{[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 B1(t)
⊤ − P2(t)C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)
×C2(t)
⊤
]
ϕˆ(t) + P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)
+ P2(t)C1(t)zˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t) + P2(t)B2(t)vˆ2(t)
}
dt+
[
C1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)
+C1(t)
⊤ϕˆ(t) + (S1(t)− P2(t))zˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)
]
dW (t),
−dyv¯1,v2(t) =
[
A(t)yv¯1,v2(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 B1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 B1(t)
⊤ϕˆ(t)
+B2(t)v2(t) + C1(t)z
v¯1,v2(t) + C2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2(t)
]
dt
− zv¯1,v2(t)dW (t) − z˜v¯1,v2(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
yv¯1,v2(T ) = ξ, ϕˆ(0) = 0.
(4.34)
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For any given ξ and v2(·), from the proof above, the solvability for the solution (y
v¯1,v2(·), zv¯1 ,v2(·),
z˜v¯1,v2(·), ϕˆ(·)) to (4.34) can be guaranteed though it is fully coupled.
The leader would like to choose an Ft-adapted optimal control v¯2(·) such that the cost
functional
J2(v¯1(·), v2(·); ξ) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
〈Q2(t)y
v¯1,v2(t), yv¯1,v2(t)〉+ 〈R2(t)v2(t), v2(t)〉
+ 〈N1(t)z
v¯1,v2(t), zv¯1,v2(t)〉+ 〈N2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2(t), z˜v¯1 ,v2(t)〉
]
dt+ 〈G2(t)y
v¯1,v2(0), yv¯1,v2(0)〉
} (4.35)
is minimized. We suppose the following holds.
(L3)
{
Q2(·), N1(·), N2(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Sn), Q2(·), N1(·), N2(·) ≥ 0,
R2(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Sk2), R2(·) > 0, G2 ∈ S
n, G2 ≥ 0.
(4.36)
Define the Hamiltonian function of the leader as
H2(t, y
v¯1,v2 , zv¯1,v2 , z˜v¯1,v2 , v2, ϕˆ, p, q1, q2, Q)
=
〈[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 B1(t)
⊤ − P2(t)C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C2(t)
⊤
]
ϕˆ
+ P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2 + P2(t)C1(t)zˆ
v¯1,vˆ2
+ P2(t)B2(t)vˆ2, p(t)
〉
+
〈
C1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2 + C1(t)
⊤ϕˆ+ (S1(t)− P2(t))zˆ
v¯1,vˆ2 , q1
〉
+
〈
A(t)yv¯1,v2 −B1(t)R
−1
1 B1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2 −B1(t)R
−1
1 B1(t)
⊤ϕˆ+B2(t)v2
+ C1(t)z
v¯1,v2 + C2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2 , Q
〉
+
1
2
[〈
Q2(t)y
v¯1,v2 , yv¯1,v2
〉
+
〈
R2(t)v2, v2
〉
+
〈
N1(t)z
v¯1,v2 , zv¯1,v2
〉
+
〈
N2(t)z˜
v¯1,v2 , z˜v¯1,v2
〉]
.
(4.37)
Noting that the variable q2 does not appear explicitly. Suppose that there exists an Ft-
adapted optimal control v¯2(·) of the leader, and the corresponding optimal state trajectory
is (yv¯1,v¯2(·), zv¯1,v¯2(·), z˜v¯1,v¯2(·), ˆ¯ϕ(·)) ≡ (yv¯2(·), zv¯2(·), z˜v¯2(·), ˆ¯ϕ(·)), then by Theorem 3.3, we obtain
B2(t)
⊤Q(t) +R2(t)v¯2(t) +B2(t)
⊤P2(t)pˆ(t) = 0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., (4.38)
where the Ft-adapted process triple (p(·), q1(·), Q(·)) satisfies
dQ(t) =
{[
P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤P2(t)
]⊤
pˆ(t) + P2(t)C1(t)qˆ1(t)
+A(t)⊤Q(t)− P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤Qˆ(t) +Q2(t)
⊤yv¯2(t)
}
dt
+
[
C1(t)
⊤P2(t)pˆ(t) + (S1(t)− P2(t))
⊤qˆ1(t) + C1(t)
⊤Q(t)
+N1(t)z
v¯1,v¯2(t)
]
dW (t) +
[
C2(t)
⊤Q(t) +N2(t)z˜
v¯1,v¯2(t)
]
dW˜ (t),
−dp(t) =
{[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤ − P2(t)C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1
× P1(t)C2(t)
⊤
]⊤
p(t) + C1(t)q1(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤Q(t)
}
dt
− q1(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
Q(0) = G2(t)y
v¯2(0) +G1p(0), p(T ) = 0.
(4.39)
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Then, to make the problem clear, let us put (4.34), (4.39) and (4.38) together:
d ˆ¯ϕ(t) =
{[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 B1(t)
⊤ − P2(t)C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1P1(t)
× C2(t)
⊤
]
ˆ¯ϕ(t) + P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
ˆ¯v2(t)
+ P2(t)C1(t)zˆ
ˆ¯v2(t) + P2(t)B2(t)ˆ¯v2(t)
}
dt
+
[
C1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
ˆ¯v2(t) + C1(t)
⊤ ˆ¯ϕ(t) + (S1(t)− P2(t))zˆ
ˆ¯v2(t)
]
dW (t),
dQ(t) =
{[
P2(t)C1(t)(P1(t)S1(t) + I)
−1P1(t)C1(t)
⊤P2(t)
]⊤
pˆ(t) + P2(t)C1(t)qˆ1(t)
+A(t)⊤Q(t)− P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤Qˆ(t) +Q2(t)
⊤yv¯2(t)
}
dt
+
[
C1(t)
⊤P2(t)pˆ(t) + (S1(t)− P2(t))
⊤qˆ1(t) + C1(t)
⊤Q(t)
+N1(t)z
v¯2(t)
]
dW (t) +
[
C2(t)
⊤Q(t) +N2(t)z˜
v¯2(t)
]
dW˜ (t),
−dp(t) =
{[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤ − P2(t)C2(t)(P1(t)S2(t) + I)
−1
× P1(t)C2(t)
⊤]⊤p(t) + C1(t)q1(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤Q(t)
}
dt
− q1(t)dW (t),
−dyv¯2(t) =
[
A(t)yv¯2(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 B1(t)
⊤P2(t)yˆ
ˆ¯v2(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 B1(t)
⊤ ˆ¯ϕ(t)
+B2(t)v¯2(t) +C1(t)z
v¯2(t) + C2(t)z˜
v¯2(t)
]
dt
− zv¯2(t)dW (t)− z˜v¯2(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
ˆ¯ϕ(0) = 0, Q(0) = G1p(0) +G2y
v¯2(0), p(T ) = 0, yv¯2(T ) = ξ,
B2(t)
⊤Q(t) +R2(t)v¯2(t) +B2(t)
⊤P2(t)pˆ(t) = 0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
(4.40)
We may look at the above equations in a different way. To this end, let us set (The time variable
t is omitted.)
X =
(
ˆ¯ϕ
Q
)
, Y =
(
p
yv¯2
)
, Z =
(
q1
zv¯2
)
, Z˜ =
(
0
z˜v¯2
)
, (4.41)
and
A1 =
(
A⊤ − P2B1R
−1
1 B
⊤
1 − P2C2(P1S2 + I)
−1P1C
⊤
2 0
0 A⊤
)
, A˜1 =
(
C⊤1 0
0 C⊤1
)
,
A2 =
(
0 0
0 −P2B1R
−1
1 B
⊤
1
)
, A˜2 =
(
0 0
0 C⊤2
)
, B1 =
(
0 0
0 Q2
)
, B˜2 =
(
0
B2
)
,
B2 =
(
0 P2C1(P1S1 + I)
−1P1C
⊤
1 P2[
P2C1(P1S1 + I)
−1P1C
⊤
1 P2
]⊤
0
)
, C˜1 =
(
0 0
0 N1
)
,
C˜2 =
(
0 S1 − P2
(S1 − P2)
⊤ 0
)
, C˜3 =
(
0 0
0 N2
)
, F1 =
(
0 −B1R
−1
1 B
⊤
1
−B1R
−1
1 B
⊤
1 0
)
,
C =
(
0 P2C1
P2C1 0
)
, D =
(
P2B2
0
)
, ξ¯ =
(
0
ξ
)
, G¯ =
(
0 0
G1 G2
)
.
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With this, (4.40) is equivalent to the FBSDE:
dX(t) =
[
A1X(t) +A2Xˆ(t) + B1Y (t) + B2Yˆ (t) + CZˆ(t) +Dˆ¯v2(t)
]
dt
+
[
A˜1X(t) + C
⊤Yˆ (t) + C˜1Z(t) + C˜2Zˆ(t)
]
dW (t) +
[
A˜2X(t) + C˜3Z˜(t)
]
dW˜ (t),
−dY (t) =
[
F1X(t) +A
⊤
1 Y (t) +A
⊤
2 Yˆ (t) + A˜
⊤
1 Z(t) + A˜
⊤
2 Z˜(t) + B˜2v¯2(t)
]
dt
− Z(t)dW (t)− Z˜(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
X(0) = G¯Y (0), Y (T ) = ξ¯,
B˜⊤2 X(t) +R2(t)v¯2(t) +D
⊤Yˆ (t) = 0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
(4.42)
Then we have
v¯2(t) = −R
−1
2 (t)
[
B˜⊤2 X(t) +D
⊤Yˆ (t)
]
, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. (4.43)
Taking E[·|G1t ] on (4.43), we get
ˆ¯v2(t) = −R
−1
2 (t)
[
B˜⊤2 Xˆ(t) +D
⊤Yˆ (t)
]
, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. (4.44)
Putting (4.43) and (4.44) into (4.42), we get
dX(t) =
[
A1X(t) + (A2 −DR
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2 )Xˆ(t) + B1Y (t) + (B2 −DR
−1
2 (t)D
⊤)Yˆ (t)
+ CZˆ(t)
]
dt+
[
A˜1X(t) + C
⊤Yˆ (t) + C˜1Z(t) + C˜2Zˆ(t)
]
dW (t)
+
[
A˜2X(t) + C˜3Z˜(t)
]
dW˜ (t),
−dY (t) =
[
(F1 − B˜2R
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2 )X(t) +A
⊤
1 Y (t) + (A
⊤
2 − B˜2R
−1
2 (t)D
⊤)Yˆ (t)
+ A˜⊤1 Z(t) + A˜
⊤
2 Z˜(t)
]
dt− Z(t)dW (t)− Z˜(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
X(0) = G¯Y (0), Y (T ) = ξ¯.
(4.45)
Noting that (4.45) is a coupled FBSDE, we need to decouple it with the similar method before.
We set
Y (t) = Π1(t)X(t) + Π2(t)Xˆ(t) + φ˜(t), (4.46)
where Π1(·),Π2(·) are R
2n×2n-matrix-valued deterministic, differentiable functions with Π1(T ) =
Π2(T ) = 0, and (φ˜(·), η˜(·)) are both R
2n-valued, Ft-adapted processes which satisfy the following
BSDE: {
−dφ˜(t) = α˜(t)dt− η˜(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
φ˜(T ) = ξ¯,
(4.47)
where α˜(·) is an R2n-valued, Ft-adapted process which is to be determined later.
Applying Lemma 5.4 in Xiong [41] to the forward equation in (4.45), we get
dXˆ(t) =
[(
A1 +A2 −DR
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2
)
Xˆ(t) +
(
B1 + B2 −DR
−1
2 (t)D
⊤
)
Yˆ (t) + CZˆ(t)
]
dt
+
[
A˜1Xˆ(t) + C
⊤Yˆ (t) + (C˜1 + C˜2)Zˆ(t)
]
dW (t).
(4.48)
23
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (4.46), noting (4.48), we have
dY (t) =
[
(Π˙1(t) + Π1(t)A1)X(t) + Π1(t)(A2 −DR
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2 )Xˆ(t) + Π1(t)B1Y (t)
+ Π1(t)(B2 −DR
−1
2 (t)D
⊤)Yˆ (t) + Π1(t)CZˆ(t) + Π˙2(t)Xˆ(t)
+ Π2(t)(A1 +A2 −DR
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2 )Xˆ(t) + Π2(t)(B1 + B2 −DR
−1
2 (t)D
⊤)Yˆ (t)
+ Π2(t)C2Zˆ(t)− α˜(t)
]
dt+
[
Π1(t)A˜1X(t) + Π1(t)C
⊤Yˆ (t) + Π1(t)C˜1Z(t)
+ Π1(t)C˜2Zˆ(t) + Π2(t)A˜1Xˆ(t) + Π2(t)C
⊤Yˆ (t) + Π2(t)(C˜1 + C˜2)Zˆ(t)
+ η˜(t)
]
dW (t) +
[
Π1(t)A˜2X(t) + Π1(t)C˜3Z˜(t)
]
dW˜ (t)
= −
[
(F1 − B˜2R
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2 )X(t) +A
⊤
1 Y (t) + (A
⊤
2 − B˜2R
−1
2 (t)D
⊤)Yˆ (t) + A˜⊤1 Z(t)
+ A˜⊤2 Z˜(t)
]
dt+ Z(t)dW (t) + Z˜(t)dW˜ (t).
(4.49)
Comparing the diffusion coefficients of dW (·) term and dW˜ (·) term on both sides of (4.49), we
derive
Z(t) = Π1(t)A˜1X(t) + Π1(t)C
⊤Yˆ (t) + Π1(t)C˜1Z(t) + Π1(t)C˜2Zˆ(t)
+ Π2(t)A˜1Xˆ(t) + Π2(t)C
⊤Yˆ (t) + Π2(t)(C˜1 + C˜2)Zˆ(t) + η˜(t),
(4.50)
and
Z˜(t) = Π1(t)A˜2X(t) + Π1(t)C˜3Z˜(t). (4.51)
Then comparing the drift coefficients of the dt term on both sides of (4.49), we have
(Π˙1(t) + Π1(t)A1)X(t) + Π1(t)(A2 −DR
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2 )Xˆ(t) + Π1(t)B1Y (t)
+ Π1(t)(B2 −DR
−1
2 (t)D
⊤)Yˆ (t) + Π1(t)CZˆ(t) + Π˙2(t)Xˆ(t)
+ Π2(t)(A1 +A2 −DR
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2 )Xˆ(t) + Π2(t)(B1 + B2 −DR
−1
2 D
⊤)Yˆ (t)
+ Π2(t)CZˆ(t) + (F1 − B˜2R
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2 )X(t) +A
⊤
1 Y (t)
+ (A⊤2 − B˜2R
−1
2 (t)D
⊤)Yˆ (t) + A˜⊤1 Z(t) + A˜
⊤
2 Z˜(t) = α˜(t).
(4.52)
Taking E[·|G1t ] on (4.50), we get
Zˆ(t) = Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1Xˆ(t) + Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤Yˆ (t) + Σ1ˆ˜η(t), (4.53)
where (The time variable t is omitted.)
Σ1 = [I − (Π1(t) + Π2(t))(C˜1 + C˜2)]
−1.
Putting (4.53) into (4.50), we get
Z(t) = Σ4Π1(t)A˜1X(t) +
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 +Σ4Π2(t)A˜1
+Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2
]
Xˆ(t) +
[
Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Σ4(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
]ˆ˜
φ(t)
+ Σ4Σ3Σ1ˆ˜η(t) + Σ4η˜(t),
(4.54)
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where {
Σ2 = (Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤(Π1(t) + Π2(t)), Σ3 = (Π1(t) + Π2(t))C˜2 +Π2(t)C˜1,
Σ4 = (I −Π1(t)C˜1)
−1.
From (4.51), we can get
Z˜(t) = (I −Π1(t)C˜3)
−1Π1(t)A˜2X(t). (4.55)
Putting (4.53), (4.54) and (4.55) into (4.52), we drive
α˜(t) =
[
Π˙1(t) + Π1(t)A1 +Π1(t)B1Π1(t) + Σ9 +A
⊤
1 Π1(t) + A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Π1(t)A˜1
+ A˜⊤2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2
]
X(t) +
{
Π1(t)Σ5 +Π1(t)B1Π2(t) + Π1(t)Σ6(Π1(t) + Π2(t))
+ (Π1(t) + Π2(t))CΣ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 + (Π1(t) + Π2(t))CΣ1Σ2
+ Π˙2(t) + Π2(t)Σ7 +Π2Σ8(Π1(t) + Π2(t)) +A
⊤
1 Π2(t) + Σ
⊤
5 (Π1(t) + Π2(t))
+ A˜⊤1
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 +Σ4Π2(t)A˜1 +Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2]
}
Xˆ(t)
+
{
Π1(t)Σ6 + (Π1(t) + Π2(t))CΣ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Π2(t)Σ8 +Σ
⊤
5
+ A˜⊤1
[
Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Σ4(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
]}ˆ˜
φ(t)
+
[
(Π1(t) + Π2(t))CΣ1 + A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ3Σ1
]
ˆ˜η(t) +
[
Π1(t)B1 +A
⊤
1
]
φ˜(t) + A˜⊤1 Σ4η˜(t),
(4.56)
where{
Σ5 = A2 −DR
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2 , Σ6 = B2 −DR
−1
2 (t)D
⊤, Σ7 = A1 +A2 −DR
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2 ,
Σ8 = B1 + B2 −DR
−1
2 (t)D
⊤, Σ9 = F1 − B˜2R
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2 , Σ10 = (I −Π1(t)C˜3)
−1.
Then, if Π1(·) and Π2(·) satisfy the following two Riccati equations, one by one:{
Π˙1(t) + Π1(t)A1 +A
⊤
1 Π1(t) + Π1(t)B1Π1(t) + A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Π1(t)A˜1
+ A˜⊤2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2 +Σ9 = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], Π1(T ) = 0,
(4.57)
and
Π˙2(t) + (Π1(t) + Π2(t))Σ5 +Σ
⊤
5 (Π1(t) + Π2(t)) + Π2(t)A1 +A
⊤
1 Π2(t)
+ Π1(t)B1Π2(t) + Π2(t)B1Π1(t) + (Π1(t) + Π2(t))Σ6(Π1(t) + Π2(t)) + Π2(t)B1Π2(t)
+ (Π1(t) + Π2(t))CΣ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 + (Π1(t) + Π2(t))CΣ1Σ2 + A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ2
+ A˜⊤1 Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 + A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Π2(t)A˜1 + A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2 = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
Π2(T ) = 0,
(4.58)
we have
α˜(t) =
[
Π1(t)Σ6 + (Π1(t) + Π2(t))CΣ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Π2(t)Σ8 +Σ
⊤
5
+ A˜⊤1 Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ + A˜⊤1 Σ4(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
]ˆ˜
φ(t)
+
[
(Π1(t) + Π2(t))CΣ1 + A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ3Σ1
]
ˆ˜η(t) +
[
Π1(t)B1 +A
⊤
1
]
φ˜(t) + A˜⊤1 Σ4η˜(t).
(4.59)
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Taking E[·|G1t ] on both sides of (4.59), then we get
ˆ˜α(t) =
[
Π1(t)Σ6 + (Π1(t) + Π2(t))CΣ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Π2(t)Σ8 +Σ
⊤
5
+ A˜⊤1 Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ + A˜⊤1 Σ4(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Π1(t)B1
+A⊤1
]ˆ˜
φ(t) +
[
(Π1(t) + Π2(t))CΣ1 + A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ3Σ1 + A˜
⊤
1 Σ4
]
ˆ˜η(t).
(4.60)
After taking E[·|G1t ] on (4.47), noting (4.60), we can derive the equation of (
ˆ˜
φ(·), ˆ˜η(·)):
−d
ˆ˜
φ(t) =
{[
Π1(t)Σ6 + (Π1(t) + Π2(t))CΣ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Π2(t)Σ8 +Σ
⊤
5
+ A˜⊤1 Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ + A˜⊤1 Σ4(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Π1(t)B1
+A⊤1
]ˆ˜
φ(t) +
[
(Π1(t) + Π2(t))CΣ1 + A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ3Σ1 + A˜
⊤
1 Σ4
]
ˆ˜η(t)
}
dt
− ˆ˜η(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
ˆ˜
φ(T ) = ˆ¯ξ.
(4.61)
In the meanwhile, we set
X(t) = Π3(t)Y (t) + Π4(t)Yˆ (t) + ϕ˜(t), (4.62)
where Π3(·),Π4(·) are R
2n×2n-matrix-valued deterministic, differentiable functions with Π3(0) =
G¯, Π4(0) = 0, and ϕ˜(·) is an R
2n-valued, Ft-adapted process which satisfies the following SDE:{
dϕ˜(t) = β˜(t)dt+ γ˜(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
ϕ˜(0) = 0,
(4.63)
where β˜(·), γ˜(·) are both R2n-valued, Ft-adapted processes which are to be determined later.
Using the above notations, we can reformulate the equation of Y (·) in (4.45) as
−dY (t) =
[
Σ9X(t) +A
⊤
1 Y (t) + Σ
⊤
5 Yˆ (t) + A˜
⊤
1 Z(t) + A˜
⊤
2 Z˜(t)
]
dt
− Z(t)dW (t)− Z˜(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
Y (T ) = ξ¯.
(4.64)
By applying Lemma 5.4 in [41], we get−dYˆ (t) =
[
Σ9Xˆ(t) + Σ
⊤
7 Yˆ (t) + A˜
⊤
1 Zˆ(t) + A˜
⊤
2
ˆ˜
Z(t)
]
dt− Zˆ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
Yˆ (T ) = ˆ¯ξ.
(4.65)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (4.62), we have
dX(t) =
[
Π˙3(t)Y (t)−Π3(t)Σ9X(t)−Π3(t)A
⊤
1 Y (t)−Π3(t)Σ
⊤
5 Yˆ (t)−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Z(t)
−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
2 Z˜(t) + Π˙4(t)Yˆ (t)−Π4(t)Σ9Xˆ(t)−Π4(t)Σ
⊤
7 Yˆ (t)−Π4(t)A˜
⊤
1 Zˆ(t)
−Π4(t)A˜
⊤
2
ˆ˜
Z(t) + β˜(t)
]
dt+
[
Π3(t)Z(t) + Π4(t)Zˆ(t) + γ˜(t)
]
dW (t)
+ Π3(t)Z˜(t)dW˜ (t) =
[
A1X(t) + Σ5Xˆ(t) + B1Y (t) + Σ6Yˆ (t) + CZˆ(t)
]
dt
+
[
A˜1X(t) + C
⊤Yˆ (t) + C˜1Z(t) + C˜2Zˆ(t)
]
dW (t) +
[
A˜2X(t) + C˜3Z˜(t)
]
dW˜ (t).
(4.66)
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Then comparing the diffusion terms of dW (·) and dW˜ (·) on both sides of (4.66), we obtain{
Π3(t)Z(t) + Π4(t)Zˆ(t) + γ˜(t) = A˜1X(t) + C
⊤Yˆ (t) + C˜1Z(t) + C˜2Zˆ(t),
Π3(t)Z˜(t) = A˜2X(t) + C˜3Z˜(t).
(4.67)
Comparing the drift term of dt on both sides of (4.66), we derive
Π˙3(t)Y (t)−Π3(t)Σ9X(t) −Π3(t)A
⊤
1 Y (t)−Π3(t)Σ
⊤
5 Yˆ (t)−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Z(t)
−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
2 Z˜(t) + Π˙4(t)Yˆ (t)−Π4(t)Σ9Xˆ(t)−Π4(t)Σ
⊤
7 Yˆ (t)−Π4(t)A˜
⊤
1 Zˆ(t)
−Π4(t)A˜
⊤
2
ˆ˜
Z(t) + β˜(t)−A1X(t) − Σ5Xˆ(t)− B1Y (t)−Σ6Yˆ (t)− CZˆ(t) = 0.
(4.68)
Putting (4.53) and (4.54) into (4.67), we get
γ˜(t) =
[
A˜1Π3(t) + (C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4Π1(t)A˜1Π3(t)
]
Y (t) +
{
A˜1Π4(t) + C
⊤ + (C˜1 −Π3(t))
× Σ4Π1(t)A˜1Π4(t) + (C˜1 −Π3(t))
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1
+Σ4Π2(t)A˜1 +Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2
]
(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) + (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1(Π1(t)
+ Π2(t))A˜1(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) + (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
}
Yˆ (t)
+
{
(C˜1 −Π3(t))
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 +Σ4Π2(t)A˜1 +Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2
]
+ (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1
}
ˆ˜ϕ(t) +
[
A˜1 + (C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4Π1(t)A˜1
]
ϕ˜(t)
+ (C˜1 −Π3(t))
[
Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Σ4(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
]ˆ˜
φ(t)
+
[
(C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4Σ3Σ1 + (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1
]
ˆ˜η(t) + (C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4η˜(t).
(4.69)
Then taking E[·|G1t ] on (4.55), noting (4.62), we derive
ˆ˜
Z(t) = Σ10Π1(t)A˜2
[
(Π3(t) + Π4(t))Yˆ (t) + ˆ˜ϕ(t)
]
. (4.70)
Substituting (4.53), (4.54), (4.55) and (4.70) into (4.68), we get[
Π˙3(t)−A1Π3(t)−Π3(t)Σ9Π3(t)−Π3(t)A
⊤
1 −Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Π1(t)A˜1Π3(t)
−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2Π3(t)− B1
]
Y (t) +
{
Π˙4(t)−Π3(t)Σ9Π4(t)−Π3(t)Σ
⊤
5
−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Π1(t)A˜1Π4(t)−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1
+Σ4Π2(t)A˜1 +Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2
]
(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) −Π3(t)A˜
⊤
2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2Π4(t)
−Π4(t)Σ9(Π3(t) + Π4(t))−Π4(t)Σ
⊤
7 −Π4(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1(Π3(t)
+ Π4(t))−Π4(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ −Π4(t)A˜
⊤
2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2(Π3(t) + Π4(t))
−A1Π4(t)− Σ5(Π3(t) + Π4(t))− Σ6 − CΣ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1(Π3(t) + Π4(t))
− CΣ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
}
Yˆ (t) +
{
−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1
+Σ4Π2(t)A˜1 +Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2
]
−Π4(t)Σ9 −Π4(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1
−Π4(t)A˜
⊤
2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2 − Σ5 − CΣ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1
}
ˆ˜ϕ(t)
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+
[
−Π3(t)Σ9 −Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Π1(t)A˜1 −Π3(t)A˜
⊤
2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2 −A1
]
ϕ˜(t)
−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1
[
Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Σ4(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
]ˆ˜
φ(t)
+
[
−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ3Σ1 −Π4(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ1 − CΣ1
]
ˆ˜η(t)−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4η˜(t) + β˜(t) = 0,
(4.71)
If Π3(·) and Π4(·) satisfy the following two Riccati equations, one by one:{
Π˙3(t)−A1Π3(t)−Π3(t)A
⊤
1 −Π3(t)Σ9Π3(t)−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Π1(t)A˜1Π3(t)
−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2Π3(t)− B1 = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], Π3(0) = G¯,
(4.72)
and
Π˙4(t)−Π3(t)Σ
⊤
5 − Σ5Π3(t)−Π4(t)A
⊤
1 −A1Π4(t)−Π4(t)Σ
⊤
5 − Σ5Π4(t)
−Π3(t)Σ9Π4(t)−Π4(t)Σ9Π3(t)−Π4(t)Σ9Π4(t)−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Π1(t)A˜1Π4(t)
−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ2(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) −Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1
× (Π3(t) + Π4(t)) −Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ2A˜1(Π3(t) + Π4(t))
−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2(Π3(t) + Π4(t))−Π3(t)A˜
⊤
2 Σ10Π1A˜2Π4(t)
−Π4(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1(Π3(t) + Π4(t))−Π4(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
−Π4(t)A˜
⊤
2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2(Π3(t) + Π4(t))− CΣ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
− CΣ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1(Π3(t) + Π4(t))− Σ6 = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], Π4(0) = 0,
(4.73)
then we get
β˜(t) =
{
Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 +Σ4Π2(t)A˜1 +Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2
]
+Π4(t)Σ9
−Π4(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 +Π4(t)A˜
⊤
2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2 +Σ5 + CΣ1(Π1(t)
+ Π2(t))A˜1
}
ˆ˜ϕ(t) +
[
Π3(t)Σ9 +Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Π1(t)A˜1 +Π3(t)A˜
⊤
2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2
+A1
]
ϕ˜(t) + Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1
[
Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Σ4(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
]ˆ˜
φ(t)
+
[
Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ3Σ1 +Π4(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ1 + CΣ1
]
ˆ˜η(t) + Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4η˜(t).
(4.74)
Taking E[·|G1t ] on (4.69), we get
ˆ˜γ(t) =
{
A˜1Π3(t) + (C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4Π1(t)A˜1Π3(t) + A˜1Π4(t) + C
⊤ + (C˜1 −Π3(t))
× Σ4Π1(t)A˜1Π4(t) + (C˜1 −Π3(t))
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1
+Σ4Π2(t)A˜1 +Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2
]
(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) + (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1(Π1(t)
+ Π2(t))A˜1(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) + (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
}
Yˆ (t)
+
{
(C˜1 −Π3(t))
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 +Σ4Π2(t)A˜1 +Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2
]
+ (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 + A˜1 + (C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4Π1(t)A˜1
}
ˆ˜ϕ(t)
+ (C˜1 −Π3(t))
[
Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Σ4(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
]ˆ˜
φ(t)
+
[
(C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4Σ3Σ1 + (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1 + (C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4
]
ˆ˜η(t).
(4.75)
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Then taking E[·|G1t ] on (4.46) and (4.62), we get Xˆ(t) = (Π3(t) + Π4(t))Yˆ (t) +
ˆ˜ϕ(t),
Yˆ (t) = (Π1(t) + Π2(t))Xˆ(t) +
ˆ˜
φ(t).
(4.76)
Then
Yˆ (t) = Σ11(Π1(t) + Π2(t))ˆ˜ϕ(t) + Σ11
ˆ˜
φ(t), (4.77)
where, we set
Σ11 = [I − (Π1(t) + Π2(t))(Π3(t) + Π4(t))]
−1.
Therefore, we can rewrite the equation (4.75) as
ˆ˜γ(t) =
{{
A˜1(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) + (C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4Π1(t)A˜1(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) + C
⊤
+ (C˜1 −Π3(t))
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 +Σ4Π2(t)A˜1
+Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2
]
(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) + (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1(Π3(t) + Π4(t))
+ (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
}
Σ11(Π1(t) + Π2(t))
+ (C˜1 −Π3(t))
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 +Σ4Π2(t)A˜1 +Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2
]
+ (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 + A˜1 + (C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4Π1(t)A˜1
}
ˆ˜ϕ(t)
+
{{
A˜1(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) + (C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4Π1(t)A˜1(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) + C
⊤
+ (C˜1 −Π3(t))
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 +Σ4Π2(t)A˜1
+Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2
]
(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) + (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1(Π3(t) + Π4(t))
+ (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1(Π1 +Π2)C
⊤
}
Σ11
+ (C˜1 −Π3(t))
[
Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Σ4(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤
]}ˆ˜
φ(t)
+
{
(C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4Σ3Σ1 + (C˜2 −Π4(t))Σ1 + (C˜1 −Π3(t))Σ4
}
ˆ˜η(t).
(4.78)
By taking E[·|G1t ] on (4.74), we can get
ˆ˜
β(t) =
{
Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1
[
Σ4Σ2 +Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 +Σ4Π2(t)A˜1 +Σ4Σ3Σ1Σ2
]
+Π4(t)Σ9 +Π4(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1
+Π4(t)A˜
⊤
2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2 +Σ5 + CΣ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))A˜1 +Π3(t)Σ9
+Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Π1(t)A˜1 +Π3(t)A˜
⊤
2 Σ10Π1(t)A˜2 +A1
}
ˆ˜ϕ(t)
+ Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1
[
Σ4Σ3Σ1(Π1(t) + Π2(t))C
⊤ +Σ4(Π1 +Π2)C
⊤
]ˆ˜
φ(t)
+
[
Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4Σ3Σ1 +Π4(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ1 + CΣ1 +Π3(t)A˜
⊤
1 Σ4
]
ˆ˜η(t).
(4.79)
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Thus, we can derive the equation of ˆ˜ϕ(·): dˆ˜ϕ(t) =
ˆ˜
β(t)dt+ ˆ˜γ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
ˆ˜ϕ(0) = 0,
(4.80)
where
ˆ˜
β(t) and ˆ˜γ(t) satisfy (4.79) and (4.78), respectively.
Theorem 4.2. Under assumption (L1), (L2) and (L3), suppose the Riccati equations (4.57),
(4.58), (4.72) and (4.73) admit differentiable solutions Π1(·), Π2(·), Π3(·) and Π4(·), respectively.
Then the leader’s problem is solvable with the optimal strategy v¯2(·) being of a state estimate
feedback representation
v¯2(t) = −R
−1
2 (t)B˜
⊤
2 Π3(t)Y (t)−R
−1
2 (t)
[
B˜⊤2 Π4(t) +D
⊤
]
Yˆ (t)
−R−12 (t)B˜
⊤
2 ϕ˜(t), a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.,
(4.81)
where Y (·), Yˆ (·) satisfy the following BSDEs, respectively:
−dY (t) =
[
(Σ9Π3(t) +A
⊤
1 )Y (t) + (Σ9Π4(t) + Σ
⊤
5 )Yˆ (t) + Σ9ϕ˜(t) + A˜
⊤
1 Z(t) + A˜
⊤
2 Z˜(t)
]
dt
− Z(t)dW (t)− Z˜(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
Y (T ) = ξ¯,
(4.82)
−dYˆ (t) =
[
(Σ9(Π3(t) + Π4(t)) +A
⊤
1 +Σ
⊤
5 )Yˆ (t) + Σ9
ˆ˜ϕ(t) + A˜⊤1 Zˆ(t) + A˜
⊤
2
ˆ˜
Z(t)
]
dt
− Zˆ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
Yˆ (T ) = ˆ¯ξ,
(4.83)
and ϕ˜(·) satisfies the SDE (4.63). Meanwhile, by (4.46) and (4.62), we can get
(I −Π1(t)Π3(t))Y (t)−
[
Π1(t)Π4(t) + Π2(t)(Π3(t) + Π4(t))
]
Yˆ (t)
= Π2(t)ˆ˜ϕ(t) + φ˜(t) + Π1(t)ϕ˜(t).
(4.84)
Proof. For given ξ, let Π1(·) and Π2(·) satisfy (4.57) and (4.58), respectively. By the standard
BSDE theory, we can solve (4.61) to obtain (
ˆ˜
φ(·), ˆ˜η(·)), and due to (4.59), we can solve (4.47) to
obtain (φ˜(·), η˜(·)). Let Π3(·) and Π4(·) satisfy (4.72) and (4.73), respectively. By the standard
SDE theory, we can solve (4.80) to obtain ˆ˜ϕ(·), then Yˆ (·) can be solved by (4.77). Due to (4.82)
and (4.84), we can get Y (·) and ϕ˜(·), thus the state estimate feedback representation (4.81) can
be obtained. The proof is complete.
Likewise, from (4.29), the optimal control v¯1(·) of the follower can also be represented in a
nonanticipating way:
v¯1(t) =−R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤
{[
(0, P2(t)) + (1, 0)Π4(t)
]
Yˆ (t) + (1, 0)Π3(t)Y (t) + (1, 0)ϕ˜(t)
}
,
a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
(4.85)
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5 Application to Pension Fund Management Problem
In this section, we are denoted to study a defined benefit (DB) pension fund management
problem arising from financial markets, which naturally motivate the above theoretical research
of the LQ Stackelberg game for BSDE with partial information.
It is well known that a pension fund can be classified into two main categories: Defined
benefit (DB) pension scheme and defined contribution (DC) pension scheme. In a DB scheme,
the benefits are fixed in advance by the sponsor, and the contributions are designed to assure
the future payments to claim holders in their retirement period. There are two corresponding
representative members who makes contributions continuously over time to the pension fund
in [0, T ]. One of the members is the leader with the regular premium proportion v2 as his
contribution, who is usually regarded as the supervisory, government or company. And the
other one is the follower with the regular premium proportion v1 as his contribution, who is
usually regarded as the individual producer or retail investor. Premiums are a proportion of
salary or income which are continuously deposited into the pension fund plan member’s account
as the contributions.
We consider a continuous-time setup, and the dynamics of pension fund plan member’s
account is given by
dF (t) = F (t)d∆(t) + (v1(t) + v2(t)−DB)dt, (5.1)
where F (t) is the value process of pension fund plan member’s account at time t, d∆(t) is
the instantaneous return during the time interval (t, t + dt), v1(·) and v2(·) are the premium
proportions of follower and leader which acts as our control variables, respectively. DB is the
pension scheme benefit outgo which is assumed to be a constant for sake of simplicity.
Suppose that the pension fund is invested in a risk-free asset (bond) and two risky assets
(stocks). The price S0(t) of the bond at time t is given by{
dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dt, t ≥ 0,
S0(0) = 1,
(5.2)
where r(t) > 0 is the instantaneous rate of return at time t.
The prices S1(t) and S2(t) of the two stocks at time t are given by{
dS1(t) = S1(t)[µ1(t)dt+ σ(t)dW (t)], t ≥ 0,
S1(0) = S
1
0 ,
(5.3)
{
dS2(t) = S2(t)[µ2(t)dt+ σ˜(t)dW˜ (t)], t ≥ 0,
S2(0) = S
2
0 ,
(5.4)
respectively, where W (·) and W˜ (·) are two independent one-dimension Brownian motion. Here
µi(t) > r(t), i = 1, 2 are the instantaneous rates of expected return and σ(t), σ˜(t) > 0 are the
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instantaneous rates of volatility, at time t. We assume that µ1(·), µ2(·), r(·), σ(·) and σ˜(·) are
deterministic bounded functions, and σ−1(·) and σ˜−1(·) are also bounded.
In the real financial market, it is reasonable for the investors to make decisions based on the
historical price of the risky asset S1(·) and S2(·). Therefore, the observable filtration at time t
can be set as Ft = σ{S1(s), S2(s)|0 ≤ s ≤ t} and it is clear that Ft = σ{W (s), W˜ (s)|0 ≤ s ≤ t}.
However, in our Stackelberg game background, there exists two different asymmetric information
for two players, to some degree, because of some practical phenomenon such as insider trading
or the information asymmetry. So we assume that the one who plays a leader’s role knows the
full information from the financial market including the price of the risky assets S1(·) and S2(·),
which is called Ft = σ{W (s), W˜ (s)|0 ≤ s ≤ t}, but the other one who plays a follower’s role
only knows the partial information about the price S1(·) coming from G
1
t = σ{W (s)|0 ≤ s ≤ t}.
Obviously, G1t ⊂ Ft.
Suppose that the proportion pi1(t) and pi2(t) of the pension fund is to be allocated in the two
stock, respectively, while 1 − pi1(t) − pi2(t) is to be allocated in the bond, at time t. Thus the
instantaneous return becomes
d∆(t) =
[
r(t) + (µ1(t)− r(t))pi1(t) + (µ2(t)− r(t))pi2(t)
]
dt
+ σ(t)pi1(t)dW (t) + σ˜(t)pi2(t)dW˜ (t).
(5.5)
Therefore, the pension fund dynamics can be written as the following form:
dF (t) =
[
r(t)F (t) + (µ1(t)− r(t))pi1(t)F (t) + (µ2(t)− r(t))pi2(t)F (t)
+ v1(t) + v2(t)−DB
]
dt+ σ(t)pi1(t)F (t)dW (t) + σ˜(t)pi2(t)F (t)dW˜ (t).
(5.6)
On the one hand, if the pension fund manager wants to achieve the wealth level ξ at the terminal
time T to fulfill his/her obligations, then the dynamics of pension fund plan member’s account
is 
dF (t) =
[
r(t)F (t) + (µ1(t)− r(t))pi1(t)F (t) + (µ2(t)− r(t))pi2(t)F (t) + v1(t)
+ v2(t)−DB
]
dt+ σ(t)pi1(t)F (t)dW (t) + σ˜(t)pi2(t)F (t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
F (T ) = ξ.
(5.7)
On the other hand, if we set σ(·)pi1(·)F (·) = Z(·) and σ˜(·)pi2(·)F (·) = Z˜(·), then the above
equation is equivalent to the BSDE
−dF (t) = −
[
r(t)F (t) +
µ1(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
Z(t) +
µ2(t)− r(t)
σ˜(t)
Z˜(t) + v1(t) + v2(t)−DB
]
dt
− Z(t)dW (t)− Z˜(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
F (T ) = ξ.
(5.8)
where the control processes v1(·) and v2(·) are adapted to the information filtration G
1
t and Ft,
respectively.
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Let U1[0, T ] =
{
v1(·) ∈ L
2
G1
(0, T ;R)|v1(t) ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T ]
}
and U2[0, T ] =
{
v2(·) ∈ L
2
F (0, T ;R)|
v2(t) ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T ]
}
denote the admissible control sets for the follower and leader, respectively.
For any (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1×U2, the BSDE (5.8) admits a unique solution triple (F (·), Z(·), Z˜(·))
in L2F (0, T ;R) × L
2
F (0, T ;R)× L
2
F (0, T ;R).
Let us introduce the cost functionals
Ji(v1(·), v2(·); ξ) = E
[ ∫ T
0
1
2
e−βt(vi(t)−NC)
2dt+ F 2(0)
]
, i = 1, 2, (5.9)
where β is a discount factor and NC is a preset target, say, the normal cost. The aim of the
members is to minimize the cost functional Ji(v1(·), v2(·); ξ) over Ui, i = 1, 2. Recall that the
first term of Ji(u1(·), u2(·); ξ) is the running cost due to the deviation of the contribution from
the preset target level. This term is introduced here to measure the stability of the DB pension
scheme. The second term F (0) is just the initial reserve to operate the scheme.
Let us now explain the leader-follower feature of the game. At time t, first, the big company
(leader) announces his/her contribution (premium proportion) v2(t). Second, with the help of
the part of informations the retail investor (follower) knows, he/she would like to set his/her
contribution (premium proportion) v¯1(t) as his optimal response to the company’s announced
decisions so that J1(v¯1(·), v2(·); ξ) is the minimum of J1(v1(·), v2(·); ξ) over v1(·) ∈ U1. Knowing
the follower would take such an optimal control v¯1(·) (supposing it exists, which depends on the
choice v2(·) of the leader and the initial state ξ, in general), and having the advantages over the
follower in case of possessing more information, the big company (leader) would like to choose
some v¯2(·) ∈ U2 to minimize J2(v¯1(·), v2(·); ξ) over v2(·) ∈ U2.
We aim to find the Stackelberg equilibrium point (v¯1(·), v¯2(·)) ∈ U1×U2, which is the optimal
control pairs of the Stackelberg game of BSDE with partial information.
There is much literature to study the pension fund management problem by stochastic control
approach, such as Huang et al. [14], Di Giacinto et al. [7], etc. However, our problems are
essentially different in that we study the pension fund problem in the framework of Stackelberg
game of BSDE with partial information. For more details about financial applications for partial
information differential games, please refer to Wang and Yu [40], Shi and Wang [31], Huang et
al. [17], Xiong et al. [42], etc.
It is obvious that this problems can be regarded as a special case of that in Section 4. So
we can use the results to solve it. For the simplicity of the calculations in this example, we set
DB = NC = 0. Comparing to (4.1), (4.2) and (4.35), we know in this section A(t) = −r(t),
B1(t) = B2(t) = −1, C1(t) = −
µ1(t)−r(t)
σ(t) , C2(t) = −
µ2(t)−r(t)
σ˜(t) , Q1(t) = Q2(t) = 0, R1(t) =
R2(t) = e
−βt, S1(t) = S2(t) = 0, N1(t) = N2(t) = 0 and G1(t) = G2(t) = 2 for any t ∈ [0, T ].
Firstly, we solve the follower’s problem. For any given ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω;R) and v2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ],
using Theorem 4.1, we can get
v¯1(t) = e
βt
[
P2(t)yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2 + ϕˆ(t)
]
, (5.10)
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where (yˆv¯1,vˆ2(·), zˆv¯1 ,vˆ2(·), ˆ˜z
v¯1,vˆ2
(·)) satisfy the following FBSDE
−dyˆv¯1,vˆ2(t) =
[
− (eβtP2(t) + r(t))yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(t)− eβtϕˆ(t)− vˆ2(t)−
µ1(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
zˆv¯1,vˆ2(t)
−
µ2(t)− r(t)
σ˜(t)
ˆ˜z
v¯1,vˆ2
(t)
]
dt− zˆv¯1,vˆ2(t)dW (t),
dxˆ(t) = −r(t)xˆ(t)dt−
µ1(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
xˆ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
ˆ˜z
v¯1,vˆ2
(t) =
µ2(t)− r(t)
σ˜(t)
P1(t)xˆ(t), t ∈ [0, T ], yˆ
v¯1,vˆ2(T ) = ξˆ, xˆ(0) = 2yˆv¯1,vˆ2(0),
(5.11)
P1(·) and P2(·) satisfy the following two Riccati equations
P˙1(t) +
[(µ1(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
)2
+
(µ2(t)− r(t)
σ˜(t)
)2
− 2r(t)
]
P1(t) + e
βt = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
P1(T ) = 0,
(5.12)

P˙2(t) +
[(µ1(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
)2
+
(µ2(t)− r(t)
σ˜(t)
)2]
P 22 (t)P1(t) + e
βtP 22 (t)
+ 2r(t)P2(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], P2(0) = 2,
(5.13)
respectively, and (ϕˆ(·), φˆ(·), ηˆ(·)) satisfy the following FBSDE
dϕˆ(t) =
{[
−
[(µ1(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
)2
+
(µ2(t)− r(t)
σ˜(t)
)2]
P1(t)P2(t)− e
βtP2(t)
− r(t)
]
ϕˆ(t) +
µ1(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
P2(t)ηˆ(t)− P2(t)vˆ2(t)
}
dt
+
{µ1(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
P2(t)φˆ(t)−
µ1(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
ϕˆ(t) + P2(t)ηˆ(t)
}
dW (t),
−dφˆ(t) =
{
− r(t)φˆ(t) + vˆ2(t)−
µ1(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
ηˆ(t)
}
dt− ηˆ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
φˆ(T ) = −ξˆ, ϕˆ(0) = 0.
(5.14)
Next, we solve the leader’s problem, noting (4.41) and putting
A1 =
−r(t)− eβtP2(t)− (µ2(t)−r(t)σ˜(t) )2P1(t)P2(t) 0
0 −r(t)
 , A2 =
(
0 0
0 −eβtP2(t)
)
,
A˜1 =
(
−µ1(t)−r(t)
σ(t) 0
0 −µ1(t)−r(t)
σ(t)
)
, A˜2 =
(
0 0
0 −µ2(t)−r(t)
σ˜(t)
)
, B1 =
(
0 0
0 0
)
,
B˜2 =
(
0
−1
)
, B2 =
 0 (µ1(t)−r(t)σ(t) )2P 22 (t)P1(t)(
µ1(t)−r(t)
σ(t)
)2
P 22 (t)P1(t) 0
 ,
C =
(
0 −µ1(t)−r(t)
σ(t) P2(t)
−µ1(t)−r(t)
σ(t) P2(t) 0
)
, C˜1 =
(
0 0
0 0
)
, C˜2 =
(
0 −P2(t)
−P2(t) 0
)
,
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{
C˜3 =
(
0 0
0 0
)
, D =
(
−P2(t)
0
)
, F1 =
(
0 −eβt
−eβt 0
)
, ξ¯ =
(
0
ξ
)
, G¯ =
(
0 0
2 2
)
.
By Theorem 4.2, we can get
v¯2(t) = −e
βtB˜⊤2 Π3(t)Y (t)− e
βt
[
B˜⊤2 Π4(t) +D
⊤
]
Yˆ (t)− eβtB˜⊤2 ϕ˜(t), (5.15)
where (Y (·), Z(·), Z˜(·)) satisfy the following 2-dimensional BSDE
−dY (t) =
{[(
0 −eβt
−eβt −eβt
)
Π3(t) +
−r(t)− eβtP2(t)− (µ2(t)−r(t)σ˜(t) )2P1(t)P2(t) 0
0 −r(t)
]Y (t)
+
[(
0 −eβt
−eβt −eβt
)
Π4(t) +
(
0 0
−eβtP2(t) −e
βtP2(t)
)]
Yˆ (t) +
(
0 −eβt
−eβt −eβt
)
ϕ˜(t)
+
(
−µ1(t)−r(t)
σ(t) 0
0 −µ1(t)−r(t)
σ(t)
)
Z(t) +
(
0 0
0 −µ2(t)−r(t)
σ˜(t)
)
Z˜(t)
}
dt
− Z(t)dW (t)− Z˜(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ], Y (T ) = ξ¯,
(5.16)
ϕ˜(t) satisfies the 2-dimensional SDE (4.63), and Π3(·) and Π4(·) satisfy (4.72) and (4.73),
respectively.
By a dual technique, we have
Y (t) = E
[
Γt(T )ξ¯ +
∫ T
t
{[(
0 −eβs
−eβs −eβs
)
Π4(t) +
(
0 0
−eβsP2(s) −e
βsP2(s)
)]
Yˆ (s)
+
(
0 −eβs
−eβs −eβs
)
ϕ˜(s)
}
Γt(s)ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
,
(5.17)
where for t ∈ [0, T ], Γt(·) is the unique solution to
dΓt(s) =
[(
0 −eβs
−eβs −eβs
)
Π3 +
−r(s) − eβsP2(s)− (µ2(s)−r(s)σ˜(s) )2P1(s)P2(s) 0
0 −r(s)
]Γt(s)ds
+
(
−µ1(s)−r(s)
σ(s) 0
0 −µ1(s)−r(s)
σ(s)
)
Γt(s)dW (s) +
(
0 0
0 −µ2(s)−r(s)
σ˜(s)
)
Γt(s)dW˜ (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
Γt(t) = 1.
(5.18)
Thus, (v¯1(·), v¯2(·)) determined by (5.10) and (5.15) is a Stackelberg equilibrium point of our
Stackelberg game of BSDEs with partial information.
Finally, the optimal initial wealth reserve yv¯1,v¯2(0) is the second component of the following
2-dimensional vector
Y (0) = E
[
Γ0(T )ξ¯ +
∫ T
0
{[(
0 −eβt
−eβt −eβt
)
Π4(t) +
(
0 0
−eβtP2(t) −e
βtP2(t)
)]
Yˆ (t)
+
(
0 −eβt
−eβt −eβt
)
ϕ˜(t)
}
Γ0(t)dt
]
.
(5.19)
35
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have discussed the Stackelberg game of BSDEs with partial information.
The general problem is studied first and then the LQ special case is researched in some state
estimate representations for the Stackelberg equilibrium point, for the follower and the leader,
respectively. Theoretical results are applied to the pension fund management problem.
Possible extensions to the Stackelberg game with noisy observations are desired to be re-
searched, and the solvability of the related Riccati equations are very challenging and difficult
research topics. We will consider these problems in our future research.
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